| 刘旻玮,李佳鹏.回溯性求偿与国际战争的诱发[J].国际安全研究,2023,(3):79-105 |
| 回溯性求偿与国际战争的诱发 |
| Retrospective Compensation Claims and Catalyzaton of International Wars |
| 投稿时间：2023-01-10 修订日期：2023-02-10 |
| DOI：10.14093/j.cnki.cn10-1132/d.2023.03.004 |
| 中文关键词: 回溯性求偿 受害者身份 后发先至 乌克兰危机 第一次世界大战 |
| 英文关键词: retrospective claims, victimhood, posterior strategy, the Ukraine crisis, World War I |
| 基金项目: |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 既有理性主义战争成因理论认为围绕战争的预期效用计算主导着国家冲突行为的选择。将沉没成本和各类既往互动经历纳入效用计算在上述理论路径下被视为非理性行为。这种理论偏见限制了理性主义战争成因理论的解释力。事实上，对于物质和时间沉没成本的关注导致了国家行为体互动时呈现极端的相对收益敏感。为规避特定一方的相对物质收益或时间优势过度累积而使冲突双方实力失衡，自认为处于损失框架下的国家不时地采取无法被对方所接受的回溯性求偿行为，进而使冲突双方的和解方案交集被极大限缩；加之求偿国与被求偿国判断对方所持决策框架时产生的认知落差，冲突双方的风险承担意愿随之增加，同时双方也高估对方的敌意而低估对方的冲突决心，冲突升级为战争的可能性因而增加。2022年的乌克兰危机和第一次世界大战前的军事动员竞赛可以分别论证两类典型的回溯性求偿行为——围绕物质利益争夺展开的受害者—加害者战略互动和为争夺时间优势而被迫采取的后发先至策略——对国际战争的诱发性影响。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Existing rationalist theories on the causes of war hold that the calculation of expected utility about future gains and losses of war plays a dominant role in states’ choices of conflict behavior. The inclusion of sunk costs and various past interactions into utility calculation is regarded as irrational under the above theoretical path. This theoretical bias limits the explanatory power of rationalist theories on the causes of war. In fact, concerns about sunk costs related to material and time lead to extreme sensitivity to relative gains when state actors interact with each other. In order to avoid the power imbalance caused by the excessive accumulation of relative material gains or time advantages of a specific party, the state that thinks itself to be in the frame of loss will from time to time claim retrospective compensations that cannot be accepted by the other party, so that the common ground on which the conflict settlement plan can be reached is greatly compressed. In addition, the cognitive gap between two parties when judging the decision-making framework of the other side increases the willingness to take risks and leads to an overestimation of the other side’s hostility and an underestimation of the other side’s determination to get engaged in the conflict, which increases the likelihood of the conflict escalating into war. The Ukraine Crisis and the pre-World War I military mobilization can be regarded as two typical cases to demonstrate, respectively, the victim-perpetrator strategic interactions around the competition for material interests and the posterior strategy to gain a time advantage. |
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