

A New Game Needs a New System

ZHAO Tingyang *

Abstract: Globalization has ushered in new political conditions and new political issues which goes beyond modernity. Internal politics and international politics, two political layers of the framework of modern political thinking, cannot effectively expound and solve political problems on the global scale, hence the need to introduce a global political analytical framework befitting the new global conditions. In contrast with modern political thinking which is based on the concept of hostile and competitive game, globalization has promoted universalization of knowledge, information and technology, and consequently symmetrical imitation of strategies will bring no gains but self-destruction. Moreover, with the high interdependency in economy and existence resulting from globalization, a new power, made up of global capital, shared technology and common media, is exerting its networked global dominance. This new power derives its authority not from its strength but from service, and its new power formula is: service is power. Thus the challenge for the global politics is not hostile competition but the optimization of co-existence. The new all-under heaven system, based on non-exclusive co-existence, holds the best chance to the resolution of political and economic problems on the global scale and world peace.

Keywords: strategy imitation; internalized world; co-existence; all-under-the heaven system

Is China now a threat? Suppose it were. However, the word “threat” is somewhat misleading and sometimes makes no sense. Actually, by the same logic, the USA could be considered the biggest threat to not only China but also many other nations since the end of the Cold War. Sensational words such as “threat” do not much improve our

* ZHAO Tingyang, Professor of philosophy at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

understanding of the reality and are perhaps only useful in propaganda. The point is that our world is changing so much so that war-oriented thinking is becoming a trap.

It is not surprising that an emerging power is not often welcome, even if it claims to be peaceful. The honest but seemingly difficult-to-say, “Peaceful rise” of China, has failed to pacify the well-established powers (USA and Europe), not because it sounds unconvincing, but rather because peacefulness is not at all the point of concern. No matter how peaceful China is, the *rise* of China is the problem for the established powers. Obviously, the ethical claim of being innocent is irrelevant to the rise of a new power.

History tells us that serious problems sometimes automatically disappear rather than settle when the world changes. The ongoing change of our world is not a change in the game but rather a change of the game. Globalization has been making history whereas our minds remain trapped in modernity, occupied with stories of past glories of one power beautifully defeating another, as in the Second World War or the Cold War. The future could possibly be of global transnational powers replacing national powers and taking over the world, in other words, the systematic powers of new technologies, financial capital and new media in forms of global networks are going to transform themselves from economical to political domination above nations and governments, to start a new game and reorganize the global society where nation-states become the “branches” of the world system. The concepts of gaming, of national interest, and of security, will be and have to be changed. Tension and deadly hostilities would then become unreasonable and foolish.

1. Who Fears Who?

The growth and decline of powers have been seen throughout history. Historians, economists, and political scientists love to explain the ups and downs of a great power in terms of their institutional innovation or conservation, pioneering adventure or overly ambitious risk. However, power transitions can appear mysterious, as if predetermined by a fate beyond our knowledge. Most great powers, including Rome, China, Mongolia, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia, have experienced wonderful highs and crushing lows. The only exception is the ever-successful American empire. Therefore, it is not surprising that the US is over-sensitive to any potential or actual challenge, such as a growing giant like China or a frustrated yet strong Russia but does not empathize with the reflective view of itself as the biggest threat to other nations. As a matter of fact, the USA is the strongest power in the world and even in history; much stronger than China in all aspects. China is now ranked second globally in terms of economy, and third or fourth in military strength; but remains poor in natural resources per capita. In this regard, the so called threat of China looks quite unrealistic, at least overstated.

The international tension at present reminds me of a popular song in Mao's times

before he shook hands with Kissinger and Nixon. The words of that song are aggressive but rather interesting, “now on the earth, who fears who? It is not true that the peoples fear American imperialists, the truth is the contrary” (“peoples” referred to Chinese and other oppressed peoples). Who fears who could be a good question if not put in humorous manner. The current situation would have been so disappointing to Mao – it seems that China fears the USA more than the USA fears China, even though China has managed to become the second largest economy in the world. On the other hand, the USA has a self-imposed anxiety about a developing China that is predicted to become a probable challenge to American domination and leadership of the world someday in the future. However, China remains far from a real threat, both in its strength and ambition.

It must be a problem with modern political thinking, which is the worst combination of aggressive realism and hegemonic ideologies. Popular political analysts are so far misled by the concepts of modern politics in terms of, among others, nation-state, international strategies, maximization of exclusive interests, recognition of enemies, liberation of oppressed peoples, struggle for the power to dominate, competition in ideologies for hegemony, and the clash of civilizations so that they are reluctant to recognize the accessible opportunities of constructive cooperation between great powers, and are even blinded to trust, peace and reciprocity that is available. I dare say that modern politics will never be relieved from the fear of a fabricated or overstated threat. On the contrary, it is itself the source of endless conflicts and threats. The point is that the war-oriented perception of the political, never updated since the beginning of modern times and no longer fitting with global conditions, would encourage suspicious anticipations and irrational actions.

One example of this is a paper entitled, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise” by John. J. Mearsheimer, which argues that USA and China are likely to have a terrible war in the future, based upon his theory of international politics that, “the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their region of the world while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. This theory, which helps explain US foreign policy since the country’s founding, also has implications for future relations between China and the United States.”¹ Actually you could find hundreds of papers sharing similar opinions, probably related to a prevailing anxiety neurosis of a self-motivated mission for a decisive battle with an unnecessarily fabricated enemy. The tragic anticipation of a war between United States and China seems a comedy now, since China is becoming much less ideological than America, but this ridiculous comedy could turn into a tragedy of all being losers if America deliberately insists on an unrealistic realism.

Were it to be true that enemies exist, does war ever make peace? Not at all, on the contrary, hostility produces more enemies and unexpected troubles. It might not be easy to explain humanity’s terrible love of war, but it is obvious that war has settled very few fundamental disputes. All serious modern problems would remain unsolved and

1 John. J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” *Current History*, Apr. 2006, pp. 160-162.

even be worsened until a new game comes to redefine the rules of game and change our mindset and behaviors. Modern political problems would likely disappear, rather than be solved, in a new game to come on global conditions.

Leo Strauss gives an interesting interpretation of the political, “All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change, we wish to bring about something better. All political action is then guided by some thought of better and worse. But thought of better or worse implies thought of the good. The awareness of the good which guides all our actions has the character of opinion – it is no longer questioned but, on reflection, it proves to be questionable.”² Indeed, so many concepts and all ideologies are questionable. The concept of the good is surely questionable, but it will be open to endless and tiring philosophical debates. Instead we’d better question some smaller concepts at this moment, for instance, national security. Every nation needs to have its national security assured, but it is unreasonable and excessively nervous to expect too much of the assured national security in terms of the non-existence of any potentially challenging power, or being a never challengeable unique power by eliminating all competing powers. It is practically so difficult to make it, if not hopeless, due to the inevitable effect of mirror, by which I mean that a player’s strategy always mirrors into the other mind. After that comes the irrational race in hostile strategies that would instead reduce the security and interest of both, for instance, the disastrous arms race, trade battle, or series of financial tricks. It could be said to be the tragedy of imitation.

Allow me to argue it with an “imitation test.” Think of a game of a kind of original situation open to all possible strategies, and every player of supposedly good ability to learn and imitate any successful strategy ever played by the others. Consequently, none of the more successful strategies could keep its advantage for a long time, since all of them would soon become common sense and easily copied or counteracted by the others. The equilibration of strategies would come before long, for the reason that innovations take much more time than imitation, so that imitators would soon catch up with innovators – say a kind of late-mover’s advantage. And the immobilized stable equilibrium will finally be reached when all available strategies have been played and all players have learnt all strategies, thus becoming equally smart or stupid. So it could explain the vicious circle in the military, economic, financial, technological, and ideological competitions.

However, a widely imitated strategy could either be a good one that benefits all (say, a strategy that makes reciprocity or common good) or a bad one that hurts all (for instance, the Prisoner’s dilemma or the tragedy of the commons). The point is that the hostile or antagonizing strategy, or the non-cooperative strategy, as it is often called, would probably ruin all players at its last judgment without any possibility of salvation, because it would encourage negative retribution or retaliation, so to speak, and it

2 Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy?* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 10.

most likely leads to a self-defeating or self-disserving consequence due to imitation. If a game goes on in this way, the tragedy of imitation will be inevitable. None of the unilateral strategies, hard or soft, could be expected to be played smartly, unless they coincide with a reciprocal strategy.

Only a fundamental change of game could stop irrational risks. But the problem is that a significant and decisive change always depends on the choice of the mightiest state in the world. In other words, a fundamental change of game would be possible only if the strongest power volunteers and determines to start a new game to stop the vicious circling of antagonizing gaming. The truth is obvious and simple – only the strongest has the dominating and unchangeable power, also its responsibility, to set the agenda for an entire change of the game. Thanks to natural grace, only the reciprocally or universally benefiting rules and strategies of a game prove able to avoid the tragedy of imitation. So the strongest power has to take the lead and set an example that could be universally imitated.

In the world at present, the USA is no doubt the strongest player, capable of and thus responsible for changing the hostile game that has been played for too long a period of time. Disappointingly, the USA seems rather conservative at this moment since it has benefited most from the present game. This demonstrates a paradox: the strongest has the power but is reluctant to change the game which holds a pessimistic future for each and all, and of which it has temporarily been the biggest beneficiary. Following Leo Strauss, we could also write that a political power aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, it wishes to prevent a change of the world order from which it has benefited; when desiring to change, it wishes to bring about a new world order so that it could benefit more. I am not blaming the USA here, because it is not the USA but rather the modern mindset to blame. A mind of modern subjectivity could hardly restrain its pursuit of the maximization of self-interests, regardless of a self-disserving future.

Could the world be better and safer if all great powers become democratic as the popular theory of democratic peace claims? I am hesitant to believe the myth of democratic peace. We should not conceal the truth that the political similarity of nations will not guarantee the removal of conflicts in basic interests – considering one of Confucius' insights, “decent men of different opinions would live in peace, whereas selfish men of similar desires always live in conflict.”³ So it should be a little bit naïve to expect a democratic peace after an unconvincing end of history. Even if, let's suppose, the democratic triumph brings the ideological debates to an end, it would be unlikely for the struggle for national interests to end as well. It is clear that world peace depends on things other than ideological similarity in democracy, and it will not come into being without a change in our way of thinking.

Modern mindsets have been questionable but not so often seriously questioned,

3 Confucius, *The Analects*, Ch. 13.

because the most beloved concept of subjectivity in pursuit of maximization of self-interests, as well as the desire for the domination over the others, has been taken for granted, thus aggravating the nervous fabrication of the threat from others. Contrary to popular belief, the biggest danger for the world or the most dangerous threat to the security of any nation is actually not the existence of great powers but rather the non-cooperative game based upon monotheistic subjectivity. Fortunately, accumulated evidence indicates that the changing reality will hopefully invalidate the stubborn modern mindsets. Now, globalization goes ahead of our late-coming reflection and it has been practically changing the world, though still not completely, into a new game in which all modern strategies for hostile competition will be found invalid. However we should not be so optimistic: the world would refuse to change, and be misled, or even ruined by insane risks driven by the terrible love for war before it could be changed.

2. When You Make an Enemy, You Make a Trouble for Yourself

A game usually ends with a final victory, though some “infinite games,” as James P. Carse beautifully names them, do not have such an end.⁴ Theoretically speaking, infinite games such as language, culture, academic research, religion, arts, love, and friendship could bring more happiness and peace to our life. So, could the finite game in pursuit of power be changed into an infinite game? Although it might be a naïve or stupid question to the ears of politicians, I would rather take it as a possible way out of the deadly trap of modern international politics.

Board games could be a good metaphor, although they are not as complicated as politics. As we know it, victory in chess means the winner destroys the loser completely, whereas victory in *Go* means that a player has achieved a slightly larger “share of the world” than the other, usually about only 0.5% success in professional play. In this sense the game of *Go* indicates an alternative concept of success – the better player does not deny the effort of the less successful, wherefore success means greater share instead of destruction of the other. In this way, the more respected player could be the less successful who has made a more beautiful and creative move, which is of greater value for the art of *Go*, as claimed by Master Wu Qingyuan, the most respected player of the game. Dr. Kissinger develops an interesting discussion of the Chinese thinking of *Go* in his book *On China*, but I would rather say that the Chinese thinking suggests a better way to coexist with others, rather than a wiser or trickier way to final success.

It is not so appropriate to describe the game of *Go* with war-oriented concepts such as winner and loser, victory and defeat; in fact it is better described with the concepts of investment and exchange. In the game of *Go*, every move could be counted as a unit of

4 James P. Carse, *Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility*, New York: Free Press, 1986.

investment in pursuit of a better reward, sometimes proved worthwhile but sometimes worthless, depending on if the continuing moves make robust “constructions” (形, *Xing*) while developing a “constructive future” (势, *Shi*). These two concepts, *Xing* and *Shi*, not yet well translated, coming from the first book on strategies in Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, a book even older than Confucius’s *Analects*, have been widely used in the analysis of political and military strategies up to now. Instead of a zero-sum game, *Go* aims at competition only for larger share, in which each of the players will gain his share in relation to his effective moves, more advantaged or less advantaged, but no one will be destroyed, as mentioned above, and will usually only incur very limited loss if one does not take an irrational strategy. Therefore, *Go* suggests an alternative conception of competitive game which beyond the deadly battle with an enemy.

As seen from true human condition, it is certainly not that people fight with others like naturally born enemies, but rather that hostility makes enemy and ideologies produce more enemies. As a matter of fact, the otherness of the others does not logically or transcendently imply the concept of enemy. That is, enemy is a conceptual fabrication rather than a natural state. To pinpoint my point, absolutely unacceptable or intolerable otherness is an ideological invention that originates in the Christian notion of the devil or pagan, who are to be eliminated if not converted. By this notion, Christianity has led to an essential change in the concept of the political, that is, a change from the public life of a polis to the distinction of friends from enemy by their otherness, which has later become the ideological sub-consciousness underlying modern politics as decoded by Carl Schmitt. Huntington’s clash of civilizations could be considered another reminder of the recognition of enemy deeply rooted in cultural exclusiveness. The intentional search for enemies would probably spoil any effort of dialogue for reciprocal understanding and reasonable compromise.

By nature, human beings should not recognize strangers as enemies unless involved in serious struggle with them for the scarce and yet necessary resources for survival. The Hobbesian state of nature as the war of all against all is neither true nor rational, seeing that the proactive attack at others is of great danger due to the inevitable revenge, obviously not a rational and wise choice for sake of one’s own safety and happiness, not to say a way to make a better world for all and each. Alternatively, the earliest discussion of original situation by a Confucian philosopher Xun-zi (about 2, 300 year ago) has introduced a better vision. Xun-zi believes that the original situation must be a societal state (instead of a state of nature), based on the evidence that collective collaboration is a necessary condition for the survival of any individual. His most penetrating insight is somewhat of a paradox: cooperation comes first for the survival of each, but it usually brings about conflicts afterwards, due to the unfair distribution of the goods and the unjust arrangement of power.⁵ In short, everyone needs cooperation but no one wants equality. It relates to the long debated but not yet solved problem of

5 Xun-zi, *The Work of Xun-zi*, Ch. Wang-zhi (King’s constitution).

distributive justice. However, the more important message of Xun-zi's theory is rather encouraging: it is not hostility but cooperation that enables each and everyone to be.

Confucianism is known for its pursuit of peace. A famous saying of Mencius, "a peaceful man has no opponent," has been a tacitly primary principle for the Chinese to deal with others. It has double meanings that one will not be threatened only if making no enemy, and that a peaceful man is unchallengeable because he is patronized by justice. It seems true in the long term. Unfortunately, the modern enemy-oriented mindset has been much encouraged by so many great minds including Machiavelli, Hobbes, Marx, Freud, Schmitt, Morgenthau, Huntington, as well as most modern strategists and politicians, and has therefore become so prevailing that it has influenced the entire world. It is true that modern China does not completely follow the Confucian peaceful ideal because of its involvement in the modern game, meaning that China has had to learn to be a modern player. Modern China has been made a conjunction of Chinese and Western civilizations, which means that Western culture has been internalized so as to be an inner component, or a problem, of modern China as well as the Chinese mind, thanks to, or imputed by, the Westernization of the world.

3. Systematizing the World

The anarchic world in which we live has been essentially a non-world up to now. The entire world has not yet been politically systematized as a whole world, even though it has almost entirely been economically systematized by globalization. I repeat my argument here because the absence of a global system responsible for the world would likely become a disaster for all nations in the coming future. The world talks about responsibility, but it means practically the contrary. For instance, America asks for worldwide support for its anti-terrorism campaigns while giving China no sympathy for its anti-terrorist practice. Please remember what is good must be what can be imitated.

There are no available solutions to the global problems that have emerged in the last decades, mainly due to the structural imbalance between the reality of global economics and the absence of global politics, which has now been made an urgent political problem for the common security of the world. There are great powers struggling for their national interest, but a global system of, and for, the world is still missing. The political systematization of the world should be regarded as an in-depth globalization, following economic systematization.

Why should the world be systematized? It is because the world has been found in need of a global political system to establish new rules which can regulate the game of globalization. Nothing has been able to stop the inevitable trend of globalization in all dimensions since it has started with the global market and economy. Therefore, the political systematization of the world, like political globalization, will come after the

economic systematization of the world, as with economic globalization. It will most likely go to the end of the modern game played under anarchic conditions instead of the end of history. Both Fukuyama and Huntington have more or less misinterpreted the critical moment of the end of Cold War, which was certainly a decisive change or a historical turning point. It actually indicates the beginning of global politics, rather than the end of history as the triumph of western civilization or the restart of the cultural hostilities of civilizations. On the contrary, global politics expects the conjunction of civilizations.

Politics develops itself according to the need of new rules of the game. It includes at least three levels: internal, international, and global politics. As we know, the public life, for instance, political affairs, of the Ancient Greek polis was defined as and confined to internal politics (which could be democracy or monarchy, depending on the situation), whereas conflicts between states remained the natural battle in anarchic condition or in the “state of nature” rather than something political. As time went on, international politics has come in turn to deal with exterior problems. The Treaty of Westphalia has usually been regarded as the beginning of the system of nation-states as well as the modern international political system. Unfortunately, the modern world has witnessed even more bloody wars among nations under the anarchic conditions, in spite of international laws and the establishment of the UN. They have failed to be responsible for the growing global problems, because the UN, like other international organizations, is not above nation-states, but instead, is on the same political level as the other political entities. In other words, international organizations do not wield power or authority higher than the sovereignty of any nation-state. Now the world finds itself in need of global politics since globalization involves all nations. The earliest apparent attempts to start global politics were the wars led by America on Iraq and Serbia in the name of human rights above sovereignty. Unfortunately, waging these wars proved to be doing global politics in the wrong way for the wrong reason. It is nothing but the long-used unilateral imperialism rather than any introduction of a new political concept. It could be said that America has wasted its opportunity to establish a kind of reasonable global politics. Now our anarchic world is still waiting for a new system of globality; or a world system of worldness as I call it, to come in the future.

Global politics is meant to deal with the worldwide problems of economy, technologies, military power, and ideologies, not only much larger and wider in size but also essentially different from international issues between or among nations. It indicates an entirely new concept of the political, focusing on universal compatibility instead of particular disputes. As anticipated, all “best” strategies developed and recognized in the international game in pursuit of unilateral maximization of power and national interest would become invalid or inefficient, if not complete, failures, because they are no more classified than the rational or reasonable strategies on the conditions of globalization. The simple fact is that the world has changed. Philosophically, the “ontological” conditions of the political game have changed, therefore we have to live

a different life.

Globalization has brought about the common market, common knowledge, common standards, internet, global financial manipulation, and the transnational companies in the world. All of these are making an interiorized reality of the world. In other words, globalization means interiorization of the world, and the interiority of the world will take the place of the internationality so much so that the ever problematic “externalities” are now being transformed into problematic internalities instead. It should be noted that the interiorization of the world does not necessarily bring about a revisit to a sort of internal politics, say, of a world republic, which is unfortunately “not the will of nations” as Kant was well aware of, and practically too difficult to be realized. If it is not milder and less radical, global politics should be something both new and old: being new so as to deal with the new problems, and being old so as to be consistent with established traditions and reality.

In modern times, only a few leading nations enjoyed their fortune of asymmetric advantages in knowledge and technologies and therefore greatly benefited in their competition with, or more correctly, their domination over the underdeveloped nations. But their asymmetric bonus has been gradually reduced by the ever exploited and oppressed nations which are becoming better competitors by learning and imitating. Now the modern competitive game is coming to a deadlock, reaching its critical moment to change, a moment of a transitive “original situation” to a new game in which modern international politics will become awkward.

Globalization is leading to the remaking of power rather than the redistribution or transference of power. It is far more than an old story of growth and decline of nations. Globalization opens all spaces for global networks, connections and communications, so that financial capital, new technologies and new media enjoy much more freedom than ever to grow and colonize every corner of the world. At the same time, they are transforming themselves from economic powers into political powers and the backstage powers de facto to decide everything for the world. On the other hand, governments are becoming the representatives or managing offices for these new powers. In this sense, global financial capital, high technology and new media should be otherwise more identified as the emerging global powers by themselves than the resources pertaining to national powers as they were. What is more, an advantage of their systematic existence is in the form of networks everywhere; rather than independent entities somewhere. They fit better with globalization yet produce new problems that international politics fails to deal with. The fundamental change brought by globalization could be characterized as the new transference of power from the national to the systematic, not that between great powers. Peacefully and gradually, the global powers of financial capital, high technologies and new media are institutionalizing and integrating the world by developing interdependent connections between all nations. In this regard, they have changed the ontological conditions of the world. The closer interdependency of nations would invalidate the unilateral strategies and suggests

reciprocal interrelations for the better survival and interest of each and every nation.

But a danger should be taken into account before the world is entirely systematized. Following the logic of power, financial capital, high technologies, and new media are taking possession of the world with the irresistible best service provided by their systematic networks, so much so that we should say that service is power. And they will probably lead to a sort of new despotism based upon and supported by, ridiculous and paradoxical as it seems, free market and democratic public choices, and take advantage of being free of control in the anarchic non-world. Nothing could stop the process from the globalization to the systematization of the world, but the question is whether our world can be politically systematized in a proper way. In short, global politics should come and settle the new problems that international politics could not solve.

Reality goes ahead of minds. The path of dependence on international politics could prevent the world from its turning to global politics. As the systematization of the world has changed the ontological conditions of our existence, the basic ontological “unit” that could better explain the global reality must be *relations* rather than entities, since our existence is tied to all kinds of global networks. The modern dream of “independency” of existence will not mean as much as it did, because existence presupposes coexistence, or in other words, coexistence precedes existence. In view of the ontological change of the world, the new way to power of the world is to develop best service for all, instead of defeating or even destroying enemies. And the expected political system of the world should be a coordination system rather than a ruling system.

The available concept of global politics could be, as I have argued elsewhere, a reasonable renewal of the ideal concept of all-under-heaven system (*Tianxia* system), an all-inclusive and all-compatible system for the world, as once designed and partly practiced by the Zhou dynasty of China about 3,000 years ago.⁶ In my revisiting of the concept of all-under-heaven, the philosophy underlying the all-under-heaven system possesses the concept of ontological *compatibility* of the diversities (和, which has been wrongly translated as “harmony”), which is otherwise closest to Leibniz’s concept of *compossibility* of the richest collection of beings, based on the ontology of *letting all beings be* as the richest, most balanced, most peaceful and most enduring situation of the world, first claimed in the first Chinese book on metaphysics, *the Book of Changes* (I-Ching). And the epistemological methodology for all-under-heaven could trace back to Lao-zi’s view that “The world could only be well understood with a perception of world-size,”⁷ as well as the concept of *relational rationality* developed from the

6 See Zhao Tingyang, “A Political Philosophy of World in terms of All-under-heaven (*Tianxia*),” *Diogenes*, Vol. 56, No. 15-18, pp. 5-18; Zhao Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept All-under-heaven,” in William Callahan and Elena Barabantseva, eds., *China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011; Zhao Tingyang, “All-under-heaven and Methodological Relationalism,” in Fred Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyang, eds., *Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and Perspectives*, Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2012, pp. 46-66.

7 Lao-zi, *Tao Te Ching*, Ch.64.

Confucian concepts of *humane concern* and *human obligations* (Jen and Yi). That is to say, relational rationality is more risk-proof than individual rationality, in terms of the minimization of mutual destruction above the maximization of self-interest. If an all-inclusive system of all-under-heaven were a reality, it could work better in bringing about a world of perpetual peace than the Kantian project that fails to deal with the Huntingtonian problem. An all-under-heaven peace requires only compatible relations among all states rather than political and ideological similarity.

Reviewers: Patrick Burton and WANG Wenhua