

Peace at a Price: Strategic Studies of Current International Security and War Issues*

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Abstract: This year marks the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II and the victory of the Anti-Fascist War. The WWII is an unprecedented disaster for humanity and, however, it can never be guaranteed that world wars will not break out again in the future. Just as wars can be classified as cold wars and hot wars, peace can also be defined as cold peace and real peace. Cold Peace, as an unstable state in the international relations, may bring misleading perception of peace, where peace is taken for granted, and potential crises may lead to international conflicts/ wars. This is clearly reflected in concerns of western scholars as exemplified by what is called *Kissinger's Worry* and *Haass's Question*. This paper approaches the question from a strategic and historical perspective and draws the following three conclusions: 1) historically, it takes a long time for people to realize the negative impacts of wars; 2) currently, we are in a dangerous stage of cold peace in terms of international security; 3) the Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations will be crucial to the major power relations that affect China's the national security in the future. China should find ways to deal with the two major relations and play its role in maintaining the world peace.

Keywords: international security, cold peace, major power relations, Sino-US Relations, Sino-Japanese relations

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1. Introduction

The relation between war and peace is an eternal topic of global concern. The international society has made it the primary target to stay away from warfare and guard global security and peace. It is the warfare that poses the most formidable threat to and influence on the international security. Therefore, finding ways to understand the relation between war and peace, to avoid international wars and to guard world peace are on top of the agenda in the research field of the international security studies. The year of 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Anti-Fascist War and the end of the World War II, which had brought the unprecedented havoc to mankind. People today are still in distress over the devastation caused by the war 70 years ago. "This unprecedented war in human history ravaged through Asia, Europe, Africa and Oceania and inflicted pains on almost 2 billion people in more than 80 countries and areas. Fascist invaders brought catastrophes to the world and unprecedented havoc to human civilization."¹ The calamity brought by the WWII still needs further observation and reflection before we can tell whether another world war will break out or not in the future. Besides, 2015 has also witnessed several anniversaries of warfare: the 70th anniversary of the victory of World Anti-Fascist War, the 120th anniversary of the end of 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, the 110th anniversary of the end of Russo-Japanese War, the 65th anniversary of the Korean War, the 40th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, the 35th anniversary of the Iran-Iraq War, the 25th anniversary of the Gulf War as well as the 20th anniversary of the end of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. China was engulfed in some of these wars. As the old saying goes, "Our descendants would look upon us in the same way in which we look upon our forefathers." It is essential to have historical reflection so that we can acquire wisdom, perceive changes and thus prepare for the future. We commemorate the war today in order to avoid wars tomorrow.

People living comfortable lives are liable to embrace peace and forget warfare. Especially those who live in time of peace tend to take it for granted. However, peace is never predetermined but bought at cost. Peace takes various forms: just as wars can be classified as hot wars and cold wars, peace can also be categorized as cold peace (fake peace) and real peace. And in a sense, cold war is better than cold peace for the mechanism of cold war can continuously caution the international community against forgetting the old hot war and thus plunging into a new one. In this case, the high-level political issues can automatically "control" the low-level political issues and all the countries in face of crises tend to exercise self-restraint and tolerance, "placing the collective interests as priority." On the other hand, cold peace, in the mask of peace,

1 Hu Jintao, "The Address at the Ceremony to Commemorate the 60th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War," *People's Daily*, Sept., 4, 2005, 2nd edition (胡锦涛:《在纪念中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利60周年大会上的讲话》,载《人民日报》,2005年9月4日,第2版)。

might mislead people into the illusion that peace is predetermined and war is far away from us. As a result, some medium and small countries might become “capricious,” and major powers tend to discard their tolerance, so that the low-level issues are liable to “transgress,” which might trigger off areal large-scale crisis and peril. Cold peace is a very unstable state of international relationship and the current world is well immersed in such a cold peace.

A world in cold peace manifests itself in the following aspects: the major powers attempt to contain each other by their gaming strategies, and the medium and small-sized countries indulge themselves in “capricious” misbehaviors, consequently tremendous unstable risks lurking beneath the peaceful facade of international security. The current world is in a sense on the brink of disorder and chaos. Recently the academic efforts in the field of international relations studies is preoccupied with Kissinger’s Worry and Haass’s Question, which exemplify people’s concern over cold peace. The so-called Kissinger’s Worry derives its name from Henry Alfred Kissinger, renowned American strategic scholar who, concerned about the unfavorable changing tendency in current and future world order, believes that the current world is in a long-term, seemingly orderly but progressively disorderly tendency, detrimental to the future peace and development of the world. This view is presented in Kissinger’s recently published bestseller *World Order*. In the book, he puts all the “world orders” in history into three categories: Asian hierarchal order, Islamic “black and white” religious order and European Westphalian equilibrium order, but according to him, the genuine “world order” has never come true. The current world order is based on the Westphalian order, but confronted with a rigorous challenge: If Asian countries fail to break free from the shackles of their ancient nationalist glory and hatred, the differences might drag them into the abyss of wars; Mid-east Islamic Jihad extremists, rising from the chaos of religious and regional conflicts, tend to reestablish the Islamic order by extremist means; Europe is stepping away from the orthodox “sovereign principles,” and the United States is wavering among a series of incompatible principles, ready to shake off its roles as “the world police” and “balancer.” According to Kissinger, two things spark off the above-mentioned problems: on the one hand, the current world is in the process of multi-polarization and the new technological revolution has complicated the international relations, which makes it hard to reach a new “power balance”; on the other hand, the United States suffers from power decline, and the world major power centers fail to reach a consensus over the “legitimacy” of the world order, with a slim hope of forming a universal value system. As the chairman of American Committee of Foreign Relations (CFR), America’s celebrated think tank, Richard N. Haass exerts immense and growing influences on the American strategy circle. In the autumn of 2014, the publication of his article entitled *The Era of Disorder* in American Journal *Diplomacy* has attracted overspread attention in the field of international relations studies. The current world is, therefore, possibly in a new era, an era of disorder. As Haass argues in his essay, “Is this change an independent event, or the beginning of a

long-term tendency?” This question will be termed here as Haass’s Question, which echoes a worry over the chaos and disorder in international relations and a strategic concern over the various emerging crises and potential risks. In fact, The Question has something in common with Kissinger’s Worry. Haass attributes the loss of order to American dereliction of duty and his view poses some influences on America’s diplomacy. His employment of the term “the Era of Disorder” is designed to stimulate the American administration into performing their duties. In one word, the so-called Haass’s Question can also be interpreted as American strategy scholars’ concern and worry over the disorder of the current world. On the other hand, it also reflects the helpless dissatisfaction of American strategic elites with the retreat of the American forces.

If the international community is incapable of the in-depth perception and proper management of cold peace, international wars might break out, which will bring an end to the world peace. At this 70th anniversary of commemorating the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, this paper attempts to investigate the strategy of international security and warfare so as to overcome cold peace. The investigation will be made from the historical, realistic and futuristic perspective against the background of China’s national security and major power relations.

2. The Historical Perspective

What is war? In 1832, Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz observed in his well-noted book *On War* that “War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,” and “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”²

It is said that the world history is the history of world wars because warfare lasts longer than peace in the history of international relations. Though a little bit radical, this view reveals a very important fact that war and peace are two normal states in international relations. Besides, the history of international relations is in a way indeed the history of world wars because there are many wars in the history of international relations. Therefore, peace is even regarded as “half-time intermission” of wars. In *On War*, Clausewitz writes, “war is one part of human society, the highest reflection of the conflicts in international community and these conflicts can only be resolved by way of war.”³ He then analyzes the suspension of military actions of the two parties who have

2 Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by Chinese People’s Liberation Army Science Academy, Beijing: the Commercial Press, 1997, pp. 23, 43 (〔德〕克劳塞维茨:《战争论》, 中国人民解放军科学院译, 北京: 商务印书馆 1997 年版, 第 23、43 页)。

3 Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 97.

armed themselves for strife: The equilibrium of forces cannot produce a suspension of action and the temporary peace can only be brought about by one single motive — both of them are waiting for a more favorable moment for action. So “peace is nothing but the temporary absence of warfare.”⁴ Besides, holding a very pessimistic view toward human rationality, Clausewitz cherishes few hopes toward the possibilities of peace-keeping in the international community. According to him, although national countries, in the process of acquiring or promoting a political objective, do not always plunge into wars, they are often confronted with the dangers of warfare, because it is so hard to establish an absolute equilibrium of the forces between these countries against the background of the complicatedly changing global circumstances.⁵

If one asks, “do you enjoy wars?” Most of rational persons in normal sense will give the negative answer. It is “shared humanity” to oppose and reject warfare and seek after peace. Wars usually bring destructive aftermath, both inhuman casualties and economic damages. Since modern Westphalian system has come into shape, the death toll caused by world wars in the recent four centuries is on the increase by geometric progression. According to incomplete statistics, the world wars in the 18th century claimed 7 million lives, almost 15% increase over the 17th century; the world wars in the 19th century claimed 19.4 million lives, almost 177% increase over the 18th century; while in the past 20th century, the world wars claimed 109.7 million lives, 5.7 times of the death toll in 19th century.⁶ Particularly the death toll caused by the war commemorated in this 70th anniversary is two thirds of that in the 20th century.

Why did some countries constantly launch wars by way of military forces against other countries? Perceptions of the war have evolved through history. Occasionally, some countries might consider warfare as something good because in their eyes war can whet the will of their compatriots and empower the state. For instance, Japan, after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, was transformed miraculously into a “western country in Asia” after several foreign wars. In the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, Japan defeated China and the huge sum of indemnities (230 million liang of silver ingots) it obtained from China put Japan onto the expressway of modernization; In the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, Japan defeated Russia, snatching away Russian privileges in northeast China and coming to rank among western super powers; In 1914, Japan declared war against Germany and grabbed German Sphere of Influence in Shandong Peninsular in China which facilitated the growth of the Japanese power; In 1931, Japan occupied all the three provinces in northeastern China by provoking the Mukden Incident. In this light, before the WWII, even the Japanese civilians held favorable opinions toward the wars because a series of aggressive wars gave them continuous boosts in their national

4 Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 38.

5 Lin Hongyu, “Strategic Studies on China’s Security Environment and Peaceful Rise,” *People’s Forum*, No. 2 (2013), p. 40 (林宏宇:《中国安全环境与和平崛起策论》, 载《人民论坛》, 2013年第2期, 第40页)。

6 Wang Jun, “War, Peace and Global Management,” *Journal of International Security Studies*, No. 6 (2014), p. 31 (王军:《战争、和平与全球治理》, 载《国际安全研究》, 2014年第6期, 第31页)。

power. This might be one of the key causes of the permeating militarism fervor in Japan.⁷ Edward Glaeser, American Economic Professor in Harvard University, argues in his research findings: War is always supported by the civilians even if these civilians cannot obtain any tangible materialistic benefits from the war and sometimes might lose a lot because the leaders always “intentionally emphasizes the threat and despicable character of the rival country” to “instigate the hatred of the civilians toward them,” “and they may start wars even if those wars run counter to their country’s interests.”⁸ This is clearly shown in the Iraq War that the United States launched. Under the trumpeting of Bush Jr.’s Administration, the congressmen from the two incumbent political parties and many civilians were convicted that they should launch the war against Iraq, although later on the US government had to acknowledge that it was a fabricated excuse to accuse Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction, and nevertheless American civilians still endured a decade of agony brought by the war. It is just like what Jean J. Rousseau stated in his *The Plan for Perpetual Peace*, “The avaricious rulers feed their ambitions on the lust for territory expansion and centralized dictatorship; while the alienated civilians, blind to the suffering brought by the war, hysterically volunteer their financial and human resources to support their rulers’ conquests. The rulers’ greed and civilians’ alienation complement each other.”⁹ Today, we seem to detect this alienation in Japanese civilians. For example, according to the latest media poll, almost 60% of Japanese civilians support the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to Yasukuni War Shrine. According to another research finding in Japanese National Defense Academy, “now, 90% of Japanese support the enforcement of Japanese military force, which is the fundamental change in Japanese political ecology in the last 40 years.”¹⁰ We have to be vigilant against and contemplative on these findings.

Moreover, it’s harrowing to see the attitude of the Japanese government towards its historical responsibility in international wars. As another provoker of the WWII, Germany maintains a more rightful attitude towards its historical responsibility for the war. It takes the initiative in shouldering its due responsibility, making honest apologies, paying active compensation and punishing severely its war criminals. With this image of a responsible super power, Germany has won the forgiveness of the international community. History can shed light on the two causes of their difference: for one thing, Japan and Germany bear different understandings of Fascism; for the other thing, against the background of the Cold War, the United States diverges in its military strategy towards Europe and Asian-Pacific region. The first point is reflected

7 Lin Hongyu, “Strategic Studies on China’s Security Environment and Peaceful Rise,” *People’s Forum*, No. 2 (2013), p. 43 (林宏宇:《中国安全环境与和平崛起策论》, 载《人民论坛》, 2013年第2期, 第43页)。

8 Edward Glaeser, “The Political Economy of Warfare,” Discussion Paper Number 2125, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 2006, p. 39.

9 Rousseau, *The Complete Works of Jean J. Rousseau*, Vol. V, translated by Li Pingou, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2012, p. 25 ([法]卢梭:《卢梭全集》第5卷, 李平沅译, 北京:商务印书馆2012年版, 第25页)。

10 Natalie Guibert, “Japanese Endeavor for Marine Modernization,” *Le Monde*, April 29, 2015, requoted by *Reference News*, May 12, 2015 ([法]纳塔莉·吉贝尔:《日本致力于使海军现代化》, 载《世界报》, 2015年4月29日, 转引自《参考消息》, 2015年5月12日, 第6版)。

in the different perceptions the leaders of the German and Japanese government hold towards Fascism. German leaders are firmly against Nazi-Fascism and earnestly take the responsibility of war, while their Japanese counterparts hold vague attitudes toward Japanese Fascism (Militarism) and make attempt to shirk the war responsibility. Two Post-war German Chancellors have played a key role in this matter: one is Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the other Willy Brandt, the chancellor who has won the Nobel Peace Prize. Adenauer himself detested the Prussianism for its militarism as well as Nazi-Fascism. When he was young, Adenauer was imprisoned in the concentration camp on account of his opposition to Hitler. In his term, he was determined to punish and obliterate the relics of Fascism by the way of legislation. As a more staunch anti-Fascism fighter, Brandt was forced into an exile in his struggle against Hitler when he was young. Like Adenauer, Brandt saw the significance of peace to Germany, a country devastated by warfare. In his term, Brandt never evaded the monstrous crimes that Nazi-Germany had committed during the WWII. He not only faced up to the history, but also made a valiant apology. In his visit to Poland in December 1970, Brandt unexpectedly knelt down at the monument to victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, which shocked the whole world. He became the first German chancellor to visit Israel in June, 1973. Brandt recited the Bible in Holocaust Memorial in Israel and announced, "Jerusalem is neither the first nor the last place I recapture the past, but it is the most important stand because it completely demonstrates our dark past and goads us into taking our responsibility as Germans."¹¹ Brandt abandoned his personal dignity in his "Warschauer Kniefall (Warsaw kneel)," which impresses us even today. This is the most impressive apology for crime in Europe for the last one thousand years. Brandt's perception of history not only moved post-war Germany onto the one-way road of self-examination and accounts-settlement with Nazi crimes, but also plays a key role in easing the tension since the Cold War and safeguarding the European peace. Just as pointed by the chairman of the awarding ceremony of the Nobel Peace Prize, "from the ending of the WWII, the German Problem in suspense remains a potential threat to peace. As a German chancellor working for the rights of German people, Brandt extends a reconciliatory hand to the past rival, runs enthusiastically for the European peace and makes celebrated contribution to the foundation of European peace cause."¹² However, let's take a look at Japan. Many of its prime ministers in the postwar period were war criminals such as Kishi Nobusuke (the grandfather of Abe Shinzo), and naturally it would not be easy for them to settle accounts with Japan's Militarism-Fascist past.

As a matter of fact, the United States put its focus on Europe, the main battlefield of the Cold War. Regarding Japan as its major ally in Asia, the United States relies on

11 Oriana Fallaci, *Interview with History*, translated by Ji Shupe, et al., Nanjing: Yi Lin Press, 2012, p. 406 (〔意〕奥里亚娜·法拉奇:《风云人物采访记》, 嵇书佩等译, 南京: 译林出版社 2012 年版, 第 406 页)。

12 Yin Shouzheng, Jiang Yuguo, *Willy Brandt: A Portrait for a German Statesman*, Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 1985, p. 181 (殷寿征、蒋裕国:《维利·勃兰特: 一个德国政治家的画像》, 北京: 时事出版社 1985 年版, 第 181 页)。

Japanese forces and has most of its troops stationed in Japan. The United States needs the assistance of Japan, and therefore turns a blind eye to the spread of Right Wing Conservatives in Japan. This is one of the key reasons Japan has been shunning from the introspection towards their own atrocities in the WWII.

In addition, as the main engineer of the postwar system, the United States fails to have a clear understanding of the problems of war, which partially leads to our worries over the history of world war. After the end of the WWII, the United States launched one single war every ten years — from the Korean War in 1950's, the Vietnam War in 1960's, the Gulf War in early 1990's, the Kosovo War in 1999 to the Iraq War in 2003. This is closely related to the mighty interests group of both the military forces and manufacturers in the United States. In this sense, there is an intense motive to start the war engine in the United States. Therefore, some American strategists argue, “the United States become addicted to war, afraid of peace, because preparing for war, without asking why war is necessary, has arguably become part of our national psyche. In a large sense, the United States has been at war for so long that, collectively, its citizens and leaders have become uncomfortable with, if not frightened by, the very idea of peace. After decades of being at war, we have come to the point where we can't live without it”; “In reality, we don't want peace. We're not just entranced by war. We have come to a point where we fear we can't live without it. War has become a means to deal with our fears, while our fears have become a justification for more war.” “War no longer punctuates our history. It has become a deep-seated part of who we are and how we define ourselves. Even if only a fraction of Americans participate in war, too many segments of our society now see war as essential for the good of all. In short, we have become more afraid of peace than we are of war. This vicious cycle of fear feeding war has become a mainstay of American life.”¹³

3. The Realistic Perspective

History manifests itself that the world has mostly been brought into wars by either blunders of major powers or the provocations of medium and small countries. This historical scene recurs nowadays against the current background of the international security: the superpowers are involved in the complicated and ferocious gaming strategies, the small countries take the chance to “make troubles” and the medium-sized countries behave “capriciously.” This situation incurs deep concern among peace-loving people.

Among these three factors, the major power relations play the most crucial role. The tension in major power relations might augment the dangers of international conflicts and wars. Major power relations immersed in “cold peace” are now confronted with the

13 Gregory A. Daddis, “America Addicted to War, Afraid of Peace,” *The National Interest*, July-August 2015, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/america-addicted-war-afraid-peace-13085>.

most severe test of international security since the end of the Cold War in 1991.

“Ukraine Crisis” brought the US-Russian relation and Russian-EU partnership to a full-scale stagnation, the very indication of “Cold Peace.” In terms of US-Russian relation, the United States has been stepping up its economic sanctions on Russia since the Ukraine Crisis and exerting more military pressure on Russian strategic peripheral forces within the framework of NATO. Assuming a tough attitude toward this policy, the Putin Administration in Russia made no compromise, and prepared itself actively with both economic and military hands, pushing the United States to the end of its wits. Recently, with intensified US-Russian relations, Obama openly criticized Putin in the G7 summit on June 8, 2015, for his “pursuit of a wrongheaded desire to recreate the glories of the Soviet empire.”¹⁴ Such harsh criticism is not common in the diplomacy among the heads of state. Besides, in his visit to Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, on June 23, US Defense Secretary announced that the United States planned to station tanks, commandos and other military equipment in Baltic States, Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Poland) and Mid Europe (Germany). He said that these moves were to appease the strains felt by these NATO allies on Russian intervention in Ukraine.¹⁵

The Ukraine Crisis brought Russian-European relations to a standstill. Regarding Russia as the destroyer of Westphalian System, Europe strongly felt the security threat from Russia, increasingly calling for guard and containment on Russia; Russia, with its advantage in geography and energy, persisting in its old ways, maintains tough and aggressive attitudes towards its European partners. Russian European partnership falls into a stalemate. The relationship between Russia and European countries being not the focus here, this paper is focused on Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relationships, which directly poses influence on Chinese national security, peace and stability.

The United States is the most crucial one of all the security factors which affect the surrounding areas of China. After the financial crisis in 2008, America’s uni-polar hegemony declined rapidly. Although today’s America still exerts huge influence and control in Asia, with the impressive rise of China in Asia, the United States and China come to more ferocious competition for the realistic interest, geographic politics and regional dominance in Asia. Much concerned about its “power handover” to China, the United States attempts to employ the “comeback”/ “rebalance” strategies to thwart the potentials of its peaceful rise, which is the most significant strategic target that the United States chooses to curb Chinese rapid rise and damp down China’s international influence.

To sabotage the geographical security around the southern-eastern part of China is a key choice for America to contain China’s rapid development. The current geographical security pattern in East Asia was shaped with the ending of the WWII — the north-

14 “Foreign Media: G7’s Unexpected Severity on Russia, Threatening a Dearer Price,” *Reference News Online*, (《外媒：G7 对俄严厉程度超预期称让其付出更高代价》，参考消息网)，<http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/world/20150610/812646.shtml>.

15 Reuters, from Tallinn, June 23, quoted from *Reference News*, 1st edition, June 25, 2015.

south confrontation of US, Japan and South Korea at one side and China, Russia and North Korea at the other. Today, for the United States, East Asia confrontation in the typical Cold War style has given way to the strategic target of containing China's rapid development. Therefore, "the First and Second Island Chains" tailor-made by the United States for China more than 60 years ago comes in handy. US' allies, the countries in the island chain, i.e. Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, naturally step onto the stage. As it happens, some of these countries have disputes over islands or territorial waters with China, providing the best opportunity for America to "directionally detonate" the island chain. The direct signal for this move was sent by US' large-scale adjustment of its military deployment in Asia-Pacific region.

For one thing, the United States continues to fortify its military security deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, further enlarge its security edges against China and defend its security dominance in the Asia-Pacific area. By actively pushing on its defense deployment strategy, US shifts the key of its military deployment from "First Island Chain" to "Second Island Chain" with Guam in West Pacific Ocean as its crux base and Australia as its backup base. After the relocation, Guam will possess 25% of US Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force in Asia-Pacific area, and US military personnel stationed in Guam have also increased from 15,000 to 39,000.¹⁶ At the same time, the United States also dramatically uplifted Australia's position in US Western Pacific Air Force Strategy. Besides, US military presents the "USAF-USN" (US Air Force – US Navy) battle doctrine to integrate American military resources in Far East in order to enhance US forces' "blocking capacity" and "regional deterrence" to "contain China's rapid development" and prevent China from the imminent victory and threats to US alliance.¹⁷

For the other thing, the United States will further integrate the Asia-Pacific military alliance network. As an extraterritorial country, the United States lacks the "legitimacy" of direct intervention in the security affairs in East Asia, and therefore it has to rely on its ally countries in the Asia-Pacific Region to project its security influence in East Asia. After the end of the WWII, the United States passed several security treaties such as *Treaty of Security and Safeguard between Japan and the United States*, *US-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty*, *US-Australian New Mutual Defense Treaty*, *US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty*, *US-Thailand Mutual Security Law*, etc., to establish a huge military alliance network in the region. Nevertheless, with the dissolution of the mutual threat with the end of the Cold War, small loopholes appeared here and there in US Asia-Pacific Alliance Network. In recent years, the United States, in order to fortify its security dominance in the region, started to repair this Asia-Pacific Alliance Network and reinforce its dominance in the East Asia security framework. For instance, US

16 Greg Jaffe and Emily Heil, "U.S. Comes to Agreement with Japan to Move 9,000 Marine Off Okinawa," *The Washington Post*, April 27, 2012.

17 Liu Peng, "An Analysis of the Features and the Problems of USAF-USN in US Forces," *Modern International Relations*, No. 9 (2010), p 22 (刘鹏:《试析美军“空海一体战”的特点与问题》,载《现代国际关系》,2010年第9期,第22页)。

took the advantage of “the Cheonan Incident” and “Artillery Clashes in Yeonpyeong Island” to reinforce the US-Republic of Korea Military Alliance and once and again put off the handover of wartime operational control to Seoul. The US boosted its military cooperation with the Philippines through “Huangyan Island Incident.” It also fortified its alliance with Japan by the way of “Japan’s Purchase of the Diaoyu Islands.” Besides, it took initiatives in weaving a stronger network of Asia-Pacific Alliance, and stepped up their horizontal connections on the basis of consolidation of its former military alliances. There is a continuous development in the dialogue mechanism of US-Japan-Republic of Korea, US-Japan-Australia, US-Japan-India partnerships. In this way, the United States has been making endeavors to forge “Asia-Pacific NATO” with “US-Japan + 1” as its main form.

Even though the United States denies that it set China as its “assumed enemy” by making these adjustments in military security policies, these adjustments have aggravated the international security environment around China and posed a potential threat to and put tremendous stress on China’s national security. On the other hand, since April, 2015, US launched several military moves in the Asia-Pacific Region: Apart from holding large-scale joint military exercises with Philippines, US Defense Department started evaluating its military plan in response of China’s sovereign claim over the Spratly Islands with an intention of further imposing military pressure on China. If this plan is approved by Obama, the United States will have more severe confrontation with China in the South Sea Zone, which might be the gravest challenge since America’s employment of its “rebalance” strategy in 2011. At present, two American aircraft-carriers (George Washington and Carl Vincent) are stationed in this area, another two destroyers are executing their tasks in this area and an offshore battleship (Wolfsburg) is cruising near China’s Spratly Islands and the surrounding territories. The spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry has made the statement about US Navy’s provocative deployment that “China has always been advocating the freedom of the passage that foreign vessels can enjoy in South China Sea, but it doesn’t mean that the foreign battleships or battle crafts can enter freely into Chinese sovereign waters or sky. China will firmly safeguard its territorial sovereignty in hope that the countries concerned can be cautious in both the language and behaviors and will not take any venture or provocative actions so that the regional peace and stability could be maintained.”¹⁸

In comparison to the Sino-US relationship, the current Sino-Japanese relationship arouses more concerns. Nowadays, China and Japan can be compared to two racing cars chasing each other neck and neck. In the past, Japan took the lead, but in recent years, China has caught up with Japan, so Japan kept on making all kinds of security troubles in order to impede China. Against the strategic background of US returning to

18 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Freedom of Passage in South Sea does not Signify the Free Entry of Foreign Battleships and Battle Crafts,” *China National Radio*(《外交部：南海航行自由绝不等于外国军舰军机随意进入》，央广网), http://china.cnr.cn/NewsFeeds/20150513/t20150513_518550341.shtml.

the Asia-Pacific Region, Abe Administration became more emboldened by the support of its US ally since December of 2013. He quickened Japan's pace of becoming a "normal country" and took several actions in its military security and foreign policy. He lifted the embargo on the export of weapons, set up "National Security Council," enforced the passing of the controversial *Special Secret Protection Law* and presented a series of adjustment bills on its security policy, such as Defense Plan Framework, Mid-term Defense Force Preparation Plan and National Security Strategy. These adjustments in the military security policy and military deployment are long-lasting ones and cannot be changed in a short term, which will bring long-term negative impacts on the Sino-Japanese security relationship. Apart from the publication of these policies, Japanese military forces took a lot of actions. Most alarmingly, in 2013, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force battleships, in open defiance of China's warnings, lingered in China weapon test area, and started the largest targeted military drilling since the end of the WWII. Japan mobilized from a long distance the missile forces to drill a blockage of the international High Sea pathway around Miyako Island and even threatened to shoot down Chinese unmanned fighters above the Diaoyu Islands. Besides, to intensify the competition against China, Japan has stepped up its "emergency takeoff" of the fighters toward the territorial sky above the Diaoyu Islands.¹⁹ According to statistics, the takeoff frequency has changed from once a week to ten times a week at present. This has become "the busiest season" for Japan Air Self-Defense Force since 1958.²⁰ In addition, taking the initiative to amend *Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation*, Japan attempts to join hands with the United States to reinforce its precautions and containment of China. In view of the policies of the Abe administration, Japan is gradually discarding its pacifist stance, marching towards "the war country" and remodeling its "military regime system,"²¹ which is reminiscent of its militarism which had brought havocs upon Asians.

Under the pressure posed by the US-Japanese alliance, China is stuck in an extremely severe national security situation, or "in the shadow of the looming storms." Especially, the current Sino-Japanese relations are so complicated by the territorial disputes that it might trigger off a world war. At present, China is, as it were, confronted with unprecedented security pressure, and sometimes the threat of war. Facing Japan's provocation, the Chinese government has now given responses, among which the harshest one is to establish the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.

The Chinese government set up the ADIZ based on two strategic considerations:

19 Lin Hongyu, "Current Sino-Japanese Relations and Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea," *Modern International Relations*, No. 1 (2014), pp. 9-11 (林宏宇:《当前中日关系与中国东海防空识别区》,载《现代国际关系》,2014年第1期,第9-11页)。

20 Wolfgang Ischinger, "The World According to Kissinger: How to Defend Global Order," <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/world-according-kissinger/p36158>.

21 Yu Tiejun, "Japanese Strategic Culture and Sino-Japanese Security Relations," *International Politics Research*, No. 1 (2015), p. 10 (于铁军:《日本战略文化与中日安全关系》,载《国际政治研究》,2015年第1期,第10页)。

On the one hand, this is crucial to improving the geographical security structure of China's East Sea area and establishing "the strategic buffer zone." In view of geographical security environment, China is a superpower in world's worst geographical security environment. In particular, China is in an extremely complicated and harsh geographical environment in its east sea area. Though blessed with seas and a long coastline in the east, China is not a country with strong sea force because it merely possesses seas, not oceans. The strategic pathways to the oceans separate it from other countries and regions with different political and ideological systems. China is vulnerable in face with the other countries due to these narrow strategic pathways in the ocean. To be free from this dilemma, China has to break through the strategic design of "the First Island Chain."²²

Before the policy of reform and opening-up was carried out in the 1970s, China had been "utterly destitute" and lagged behind other countries in its domestic economy. Since the 1970s, China has undergone a thorough change from an underdeveloped country to a developing country. The best choice for China's current national defense strategy is to "keep the enemy at bay from its territory." In particular, more than 60% of its national wealth is in the east of the country where its political, economic and cultural centers (such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou) are located. This area urgently calls for the protection of "a strategic buffer zone," whose east border is "the First Island Chain." China's future military forces will often take actions in this "strategic buffer zone" and Japan will have to accept this fact and stop making a fuss by exclaiming that "China breaks through the First Island Chain again." China's ADIZ in the East China Sea overlaps in some degree with this "strategic buffer zone." Therefore, it might be taken as a strategic design for China to break through the "First Island Chain" and it is an important move to optimize its eastward marine geographical security structure and establish "the strategic buffer zone." China has to make it clear to the world that "First Island Chain" is not the chain to blockade China, but rather its first frontline to defend its territory security in the east.²³

On the other hand, Japan's target is to restore the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and its adjacent islands to its original state. At present, the Abe Administration still persists in its position that "there is no dispute in the Diaoyu Islands issue," which has become the most formidable stumbling block toward the peaceful settlement of Sino-Japanese disputes on the Diaoyu Islands. Japan's position is attributed to America's strategic intervention, and the Japanese government's "strategic misjudgment" and "delusion." In a sense, China has been "too kind," as it were, over the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands, which led to Japan's "misjudgment" and "delusion." Deng Xiaoping, for the sake of long-term friendship between China and

22 Lin Hongyu, China's Marine Strategic Dilemma: History, Reality and Future," *Academic Frontline*, No. 7 (2012), pp. 6-11 (林宏宇:《中国海洋战略困境: 历史、现实与未来》, 载《学术前沿》, 2012年第7期, 第6-11页).

23 Lin Hongyu, "Current Sino-Japanese Relations and Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea," *Modern International Relations*, No. 1 (2014), pp. 9-11 (林宏宇:《当前中日关系与中国东海防空识别区》, 第9-11页).

Japan, put forth the guideline of “claiming the sovereignty, shelving the dispute and jointly exploring the resources,” which conformed to the domestic and global situation of China at his time. Nevertheless, when we were carrying out these guidelines, we tended to “keep a low profile and hold self-restraint” instead of “taking actions.” Our stance over the Diaoyu Islands issue remained too passive because we desired to maintain peace and buy time for development by giving no provocation and making no troubles. Objectively speaking, we have won time but at the same time have to face a number of consequences, among which the gravest one is to have led Japan into believe that it is “acceptable” to “exercise a factual control” over the Diaoyu Islands. As time goes by, Japan formed the “misjudgment” and “misconception” of their absolute sovereignty over the Islands. However, China has to be determined to break this “misjudgment” and “misconception.” When the Japanese government purchased the island illegally, the Chinese government flatly took the counterattack actions, fortifying the defending forces on the sea to force Japan to give up. Japan’s boats had to travel neck by neck with Chinese vessels in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands and both countries claimed their sovereignty over this island, a step closer to the actual fact that the Diaoyu Islands are a disputed territory. But this is far from enough. Japan now can only admit that there is dispute over the sea territory but on over the air territory and has never allowed Chinese aircrafts to fly above the Islands. This does not conform to the condition that the Diaoyu Islands area disputed territory. The sovereignty dispute is all-around and three-dimensional one, of both the sea and air territory. In this light, China established ADIZ in the East China Sea which covers the area of the Diaoyu Islands, offering a good opportunity to claim its sovereignty over them and at the same time preparing for its future official cruise above them. Therefore, the establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea is another strategic move to restore the Diaoyu Islands to its original state of dispute.²⁴

4. A Perspective of the Future and Policies to be Taken

The present round of Sino-US and Sino-Japan security gaming is characterized by “long period” and “low intensity” as a result of the changed cause and background. In the foreseeable future, “the security dilemma” featuring “cold peace” will take shape to some degree. At the same time, it is undeniable that this round of security gaming has produced profound effects upon the future development of superpowers’ security gaming, international security pattern as well as the global order.

Firstly, we have to be clear-minded when sizing up the United States and handling well Sino-US strategic relations.

The US is the primary factor that affects the national security environment of China

24 Lin Hongyu, “Current Sino-Japanese Relations and Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea,” *Modern International Relations*, No. 1 (2014), pp. 9-11 (林宏宇:《当前中日关系与中国东海防空识别区》, 第9-11页)。

today. It is the chief target for US's recent Asia-Pacific strategy to contain China's rapid development and hold in check China's global influence. US attempts to deter rising China by its "return" and "rebalance" strategy, which effectively triggers some of Asian countries' reliance upon America in their resistance to China. They would try to provoke security incidents so as to "involve the US in Asian affairs" and invite US to "bring them justice," in case of which America would be more than willing to amplify the effects of its "return" and "rebalance" strategies with their provocations against China. We have to weigh the situation and take appropriate measures. That's to say, we will endeavor to ease up the Sino-US relations and set up a new model of relations between the two superpowers and eradicate America's strategic suspicion towards China on the premise that USA will never pose any menace to China's core national interest and security.

East Asia is one of the concentration zones of China's security and economic interests. US's "return" and "rebalance" strategies impose huge security pressure upon east China. If China continues to put overdue dependence upon East Asia, it might step up its collision and conflicts with the US and bring undesirable strategic risks. Now the crowded region of East Asia has already taken on some features of a "security dilemma." Thus, China has begun readjusting its foreign strategy, actively implementing its "Belt and Road" strategy, pushing westward and turning the "eastward-oriented strategy" into a "westward-oriented strategy." On one hand, this strategy can swerve China from the unfavorable security condition in East Asia to the promising west Asia. On the other hand, this can help hit China's strategic target of making best use of its advantages (in economy, trade and infrastructure construction) and bypass its disadvantages (in military, security power).²⁵

Nevertheless, China has to deal with its position in the global system when implementing its "Belt and Road" strategy. Although three decades of Reform and Opening-up has immensely invigorated its comprehensive national force and its power against the hegemony, China is still an responder to the global system, though in a changed manner. To be more specific, China is becoming less an adaptor as it was in the past than a constructive modifier of the global order today. The "Belt and Road" initiative is undeniably a superb strategic design in that it ingeniously diverges the focus of superpower gaming and fulfills China's strategic shift. However, whether this strategy can be successfully carried out depends on its tactics of operation and sense of propriety. From the historic perspective of the relations between China and global system, it is not a good choice to rashly challenge the present international order and its defender (majorly USA) in the foreseeable future, or else it might incur tremendous security stress and disturb the execution of its strategy. At present, we have already made some rash moves, which has brought some harmful effects. For instance, right now, the US enjoys extremely intimate relationship with Japan. It received the Japanese

25 Lin Hongyu, "In-depth Analysis on International Strategic Significance of 'Marine Silk Road'," *People's Forum*, No. 9 (2014), p. 50 (林宏宇:《“海上丝绸之路”国际战略意义透析》,载《人民论坛》,2014年第9期,第50页)。

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for an official visit with an incredibly high standard. It held a joint military exercise with the Philippines, an unprecedentedly large one in history. The G7 made a rare statement about ocean security, specifically targeted at the South China Sea. Two American think tanks – Asian Institute and Foreign Affairs Institute published research reports about Sino-US relations and America's foreign policies towards China. An article in the British newspaper *Financial Times* (May 1st, 2015) indicated that "US has given up the idea of rising China becoming the possible sharer of the interests of the present global order." US Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate stated in their reports that they will muster all the factors of US force to keep up American "prior position" in East Asia.²⁶ Strategically, these are no favorable signs to the peaceful rise of China, which merits our utmost attention.

Secondly, to size up Japan, we can "go beyond the limits to right the wrong." That's to say, we will be guarded against war, but are never in fear of war; we will seek after the peace, but we'll never give up our central interests in the name of peace.

Since the Meiji Restoration, Japanese, though located geographically in the east, regarded themselves as westerners, despising all the countries in the east, including China. However, in the long course of history, "The west is 500 years old, while the east is blessed with a history of one thousand years." The west has only enjoyed four to five hundred years of prosperity, while the oriental civilization represented by China has led the world for at least one thousand years. In Chinese eyes, Japan is always a small country, even though it bullied China in the past centuries. Today, China is on the way of its amazing revival, its due national position and global influence being restored to its historic grandeur. Japan might again face a historic choice in the future, either following the east or running after the west.²⁷ At present, Sino-Japanese relations are approaching this historical critical point. Possibly reluctant to resign to this historic destiny, Japan tries to provoke the troubles to bring changes to the situation, making attempt to cause tension to the Sino-Japanese relations and retard China's peaceful rise by the hand of other superpowers. Strategically, China has to see through its audacity, and tactically, stay alert against it. Besides, as for the issue of sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, we have to learn a lesson, seeking after peace but never giving in to any unreasonable demands. On occasions, we can even "go beyond the limits to right the wrong." That's to say, we have to firmly claim the sole national sovereignty over the Diaoyu and its adjacent islands. Otherwise, we might even fail to come back to the "middle line" — the current situation of acknowledging the controversies of the national sovereignty over the islands.

Thirdly, we have to break through China's marine strategic impasse to turn it into a

26 "Financial Times: It is the Best Choice for China and US to Maintain 'Cold Peace'," *Reference News*, (《英国金融时报：中美维持“冷和平”是最佳选择》，参考消息网), <http://column.cankaoxiaoxi/2015/0506/769659.shtml>.

27 Lin Hongyu, "Current Sino-Japanese Relations and Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea," *Modern International Relations*, No. 1 (2014), pp. 9-11 (林宏宇：《当前中日关系与中国东海防空识别区》，载《现代国际关系》，2014年第1期，第9-11页）。

marine superpower. Only then can we “subdue the enemy without battle,” win over the strategic opportunities and achieve the peaceful rise.

Two pieces of advice are tentatively given here: for one thing, China should heighten the marine awareness of its average citizens, foster their sentiments toward the ocean and bring into full play their special role in guarding the marine sovereignty. Viewed from the modern diplomatic practice of all the countries, the civilian force plays a very essential role in the international disputes (including the marine disputes) and sometimes achieves the goal that the authorities fails to reach. Therefore, in view of the disputed marine territories, we can contend and defend with the official and civilian channels combined. For the other thing, we have to map out the strategic design to break through the besiegement of “the First Island Chain,” foster the marine right, reinforce the marine construction, formulate the marine strategy according to Chinese characteristics and transform the country from a marine power to a marine superpower. We will pronounce clearly to the world that “the First Island Chain” is not to the encirclement to blockade China, but the first frontline to defend the east national sovereignty. China’s future sea forces will be frequently sent out to the areas around “the First Island Chain,” which will become a fact to be acknowledged by the western countries including Japan. At the same time, it is necessary to step up the construction of the navy. China has to uplift its marine force commensurable to its national strength. Only then can it deter the countries who have sovereign disputes with China from taking rash preemptive actions, defying China merely by some attempted purchase of several advanced battleships and infringing upon China’s marine territories.²⁸

Lastly, we have to further accelerate China’s military modernization and effectively reinforce China’s military strength.

As a responsible country, China is supposed to play a major role in preventing international warfare and guarding the world peace. Nevertheless, with its limited power, especially its military strength, China has always been unable to do what it is willing to. Through the superpower gaming after the Cold War, we can come to the conclusion that military strength plays an irreplaceable role apart from the economic and political strength. For example, in the Ukraine Crisis, Russia took an upper hand in the issue of the Crimean ownership largely thanks to its military strength. Let’s take the dispute of the Kurile Islands for an example. Daunted by Russia’s strong stance as well as its formidable advantage in military strength, Japan’s prime ministers in several administrations dared not challenge its claim over the Kurile Islands. Besides, in recent years, Russian strategic fighters paid causal “visits” to US-Japanese joint military drilling site and US and Japan could do nothing about it. All these show that Russia’s overwhelming military strength effectively makes up for its defects in other strengths necessary for a superpower. This is something China should be aware of. It is said that Japan shuns from defying Russia, and turns to challenge China, a much

28 Lin Hongyu, “China’s Maritime Strategic Dilemma: History, Reality and Future,” *Academic Frontline*, No. 7 (2012), pp. 6-11 (林宏宇:《中国海洋战略困境:历史、现实与未来》,载《学术前沿》,2012年第7期,第6-11页)。

less intimidating country. The key here is that Japan admires military strength and power which China lacks. When they look back at the international wars, they chiefly investigate means to win a war rather than examining the central question of whether the war is just or not. For instance, many Japanese strived to find out the reason why Japan was defeated by USA in the WWII rather than search for the reason why Japan launched the war in the first place. Hence, China has to possess military strengths powerful enough to prevent wars.

Now, the Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations have cast tremendous impacts upon the orientation of superpowers' gaming and international security pattern. Firstly, it promotes China's strategic shift from its "eastward-oriented strategy" to "westward-oriented strategy"; China took initiatives in implementing its "Belt and Road" strategy, uplifting China's position in Asian-Pacific international security pattern. Secondly, the US might be thrown into the dilemma of battling simultaneously in eastern and western lines, which certainly exhausts American strength, adds weight onto its strategic pressure, diverts American international security influence and thus downgrades America's position and function in international security pattern. Lastly, the focus of superpower gaming "moves westward," a tendency of "rising west and fallen east." Among the world's four most major powers (China, Russia, Europe and USA), at least three of them have shifted the center of the game to the west of the European continent, which will possibly become the central stage of future gaming of major powers (Sino-Europe, Sino-Russia, Europe-Russia, US-Russia).

5. Summary

In sum, international war — the haunting nightmare for human beings — is never far away. On this occasion of commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Anti-Fascism victory, we have reasons to bear this historic lesson in mind. At the same time, we must be more aware of the potential crisis and hardships and the unstable world now in "Cold Peace" — with the Ukraine Crisis, Libya War, Syria War, ISIS conflicts, Yemen conflicts rising one after another, and the international community is confronted with austere test of the world wars.

China, which is on the path of peaceful rise, has to be profoundly aware of the current geographical security environment, striking a balance between war and peace, and between the security gaming of superpowers. China's peripheral geographical security environment originated from the changes in geopolitical pattern in the Euro-Asian continent and it evolved itself in the three phases: 1) from the collapse of East-Asian "Tributary System" at the end of "The First Opium War" (1840) to the founding of the People's Republic of China (1949). This a phase of revolutionary upheavals. Through the arduous battles, ancient China broke through the western besiegement and rose up in the east of the world, remolding the structure of East-Asian geographical

security environment. 2) from 1949 to the end of the Cold war in 1991. This a phase of active readjustment for China. With the changing international situation, China strove to adapt its international role to the geographical strategic environment during the hegemonic struggle between USA and the Soviet Union. China survived by the way of successful transformation. 3) from 1991 to 2030. This will be a phase when China will make endeavors to break through another round of western besiegement to fulfill its peaceful rise. The geographical security environment around China in this phase will be stabilized. Right now, China is in the “mid-term” of this third phase — a critical point of transition from unstable to stable environment. At this point, China has encountered a lot of unprecedented challenges and pressure from the current international system in its peaceful rise; Narrowly viewed, many unstable factors and energies in the surrounding geographical security environment rally and release themselves, and surge and surface, leading to the frequent occurrence of the security problems in the surrounding areas. These problems not only involve both the bilateral and multi-lateral factors in the surrounding areas, and factors of power transfer within the international system.²⁹

Among all these factors, the most crucial ones should be the Sino-US and Sino-Japan relations, which play the central role in all the superpower relations and exert its influence on the national security of China. They are unavoidable issues in any strategic reflection on world wars. Firstly, we must come to a full awareness of America's foreign strategic orientation, especially its policy towards China, which poses a direct impact upon its national security environment. It has to be made clear to the US that China has neither the will nor the desire to challenge its dominance in international system. The whole world will benefit from a favorable Sino-US relation, and vice versa. America's strategic elites seem to have long shared this understanding. They are fully aware that “the Sino-American relationship represents one of the strategic questions of the next twenty-five years,” “the course that China takes will determine much about the character and nature of the twenty-first century – ‘whether it will be another bloody century’ or one of peaceful cooperation.”³⁰ The Sino-US relation, though not satisfactory, is not so bad, either. Now a well-developed communication and cooperation mechanism between China and the USA (i.e. strategic and economic dialogues, high-level people-to-people exchange, etc.) serves as “the insurance system” for the Sino-US relations. Just as indicated in “Cultural Ties that bind,” a signed article in *USA Today* written by Vice premier Liu Yandong before her departure for the USA to take part in the 6th round High-level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE) in 2015, “Over the years, despite twists and turns in our bilateral ties, people-to-people

29 Lin Hongyu, “Breaking through the Dilemma — Analysis on the Geographical Strategic Security Environment Around China,” *China's Forum Today*, No. 6 (2012), pp. 4-7 (林宏宇:《突破困境——中国周边地缘战略安全环境透析》,载《今日中国论坛》,2012年第6期,第4-7页)。

30 “The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/joe2008_jfcom.htm.

exchanges have never ceased. Particularly in the face of global challenges such as climate change, natural disasters and terrorism, our two governments and peoples have worked together hand in hand...In the past six years, nearly 300 programs have been launched under the CPE to promote exchanges in the areas of education, science and technology, culture, sports, women, youth and subnational cooperation, all of which have yielded substantial results. At present, there is one flight taking off or landing between China and the United States every 17 minutes. Last year saw a total of 4.3 million trips made by Chinese and American people across the Pacific Ocean. During the past six years, a total of 490,000 Chinese youngsters have studied in the United States, and more than 100,000 American youngsters have studied in China. Last year alone, 75 Chinese universities hosted approximately 12,000 American scholars, and 217 symposiums were held jointly by China and the United States. So far, there are more than 240 pairs of sister provinces, states and cities between our two countries. Indeed, the growth of people-to-people exchanges between our two countries is unprecedented in history.”³¹ Against this broad backdrop, we have good faith that the future Sino-American relationship will tide over many difficulties.

Secondly, we have to handle the Sino-Japanese relationship with care and make necessary preparations. We are against the war, but we will never be daunted by war. We have to shatter Japanese strategic “misjudgment” and “delusion,” and never yield in our national sovereignty over the Diaoyu and its adjacent islands. We seek after peace, but we will never give in to any unreasonable demand. At the same time, we will give full play to the positive factors to facilitate the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, strive to restore and promote the friendship between the Chinese and Japanese civilians so that more and more Japanese civilians will come to realize the perils and tribulation brought by the wars so that strategic reconciliation between China and Japan will be fulfilled on this occasion of the 70th anniversary of commemorating the victory of the WWII.

Lastly, to transcend the “Cold Peace,” China should explore all the possible factors, historical or realistic, to narrow the gap between China and the US and do its utmost in reducing the chances of US-Japan ties. This consideration is not driven by the narrow-minded nationalistic concern of state interests, but based on the wish for peace and stability in the entire Asia-Pacific Region. Only a stable Sino-American relationship can bring about a stable security situation in the Asia-Pacific Region. On the contrary, a good US-Japan alliance does little in stabilizing the security in the region but aggravates the “Cold Peace” in the area. A good management of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relationship in the future will bring a revival of the Chinese nation who have gone through trials and tribulations and peace-loving China will become a key force in deterring the world wars. China’s rise and development in peace offer win-win chances and promises for the world to share its opportunities and hope. Just as

31 Liu Yandong, “Cultural Ties that Bind,” *China News Online*, (刘延东:《系牢中美人文交流纽带》, 中国新闻网, <http://www.chinanews.com/gj/2015/06-23/7359052.shtml>).

Chairman Xi Jinping has pointed out in G20 Summit held in Brisbane, Australia in November 2014, “China will work hand in hand with the international community to promote the fulfillment of the world dream of lasting peace and shared prosperity and make more contribution to the sublime cause of boosting the peace and development for the whole mankind.”³²

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32 “Xi Jinping’s Address in the 1st Stage Conference of the 9th G20 Summit,” *The People*, June 2nd, 2015 (《习近平在二十国集团领导人第九次峰会第一阶段会议上的发言》，人民网，2015年6月2日），<http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1115/c1024-26032489.html>.