| 王蕾.核出口控制的国际规则制定：美国在多边谈判中的行为模式[J].国际安全研究,2019,(5):133-155 |
| 核出口控制的国际规则制定：美国在多边谈判中的行为模式 |
| Formulating International Rules and Regulations for Nuclear Export Control: Behavioral Patterns of the US in Multilateral Negotiations |
| 投稿时间：2019-04-15 修订日期：2019-06-14 |
| DOI：10.14093/j.cnki.cn10-1132/d.2019.05.006 |
| 中文关键词: 核供应国集团 出口控制 核不扩散 多边谈判 规则制定 |
| 英文关键词: Nuclear Suppliers Group, export control, nuclear non-proliferation, multilateral negotiation, rule-makin |
| 基金项目: |
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| 摘要点击次数: 1448 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 美国向来被视作国际核不扩散机制的主导者。然而，尽管积极倡导实行核出口控制，美国却未能始终对该领域的国际规则制定施加影响。在核供应国集团中，相较于利益诱惑与威胁这一动用物质实力的谈判方式，美国更倾向于为规则主张的正当性提供辩护，以此推进核供应国集团准则的修改。不过，基于核不扩散规范的此种辩护，也未能保证美国达成其目标。多边谈判中两种参与谈判的行为方式分别为“议价”与“论辩”，在现有研究中对其给予了理论上的区分。在大多数情况下，美国在两种谈判方式之中选择“论辩”。对美国这一选择倾向的分析，从成本导向的理性选择着眼。此外，为解释在正当性论辩这一谈判方式之下影响谈判结果的要素，提出了基于利益分配关系的心理机制。案例分析聚焦卡特、老布什、小布什三届政府在核供应国集团中发起的四次准则修改行动，四次行动在谈判方式的选择和谈判结果上呈现鲜明对比。文章旨在深入认知大国在多边规则制定中的权力及其界限。国家行为体对于正当性论辩的关注及其在论辩中面临的困境，在规则与规范之争趋于激烈化的国际安全领域，都是日益普遍的现象。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| The United States has long been regarded as a dominant player in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, despite its active advocacy for nuclear export control, the United States has not been able to exert due influence over international rule-making in this area. In its efforts to revise the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the United States is more inclined to justify the legitimacy of the proposed rules than to negotiate through material powers such as pecuniary temptation and use of threat. However, such justification based on widely accepted non-proliferation norms does not always guarantee that the United States is able to achieve its objectives. In the existing studies, “bargaining” and “arguing”, as two disparate behavioral patterns in international negotiations, have been theoretically differentiated. As regards the two patterns of negotiation, the United States has chosen the latter in most situations, the reason of which is analyzed from the rational choice perspective based on cost orientation. This paper has also analyzed the elements that influence the outcome of negotiations in the case of “arguing” the legitimacy of the rules and put forward a psychological mechanism based on the distribution of interests. The case study of the paper focuses on four rule revision initiatives launched in the Nuclear Suppliers Group by the administrations of three American presidents (Jimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush). These four initiatives contrasted sharply with each other in terms of their negotiating modes and outcomes. This paper aims at gaining a deeper understanding of the power as well as its limits confronted by major countries in the course of multilateral rule-making. It is becoming increasingly common for state actors to pay close attention to the “arguing” on legitimacy of relevant rules and deal with the consequent challenges in the intensified contention between rules and norms in the field of international security. |
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