文章摘要
胡高辰.中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析[J].国际安全研究,2021,(2):61-85
中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析
An Analysis of China-US Asymmetric Nuclear Stability and the US Strategic Opportunism
  修订日期:2020-11-16
DOI:10.14093/j.cnki.cn10-1132/d.2021.02.003
中文关键词: 核武器;战略稳定;不对称稳定;核报复能力;战略机会主义
英文关键词: nuclear weapons, strategic stability, asymmetric stability, nuclear retaliation capability, strategic opportunism
基金项目:
作者单位
胡高辰 HU Gaochen, Postdoctoral Student and Assistant Research Fellow, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University Beijing, 100084. 
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中文摘要:
      中美两国安全关系在两国总体关系中扮演着重要的角色,研究中美之间的战略稳定关系,对于维护两国安全关系的稳定具有重要意义。中国的核威慑实力弱于美国,中美之间呈现出不同于传统战略稳定关系的不对称核稳定态势。中国对美国存在一定的核威慑能力,但有效性仍有差距和不足。这一差距容易使美国产生压制和削弱中国核报复能力的机会主义思想。实施限制损伤战略、发展导弹防御能力、进行战略反潜是美国对中国实施战略机会主义的主要行动。美国谋求削弱中国核报复能力、打破中美不对称核稳定的企图,与中国努力维持核威慑能力、维持中美不对称核稳定的行为形成了两股力量相持的态势。中国应重点提升核武器的质量,提高威慑信号的传递效能,以可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力打消美国战略机会主义心态,维持两国间的战略稳定,特别是危机稳定性,筑牢遏制战争爆发的基础。
英文摘要:
      It is notable that the security relationship between China and the United States plays a pivotal role in the overall Sino-US relations and studies on the strategic stability between the two countries are of paramount significance for maintaining the stability of the bilateral security relations. The relatively weaker capacity in China’s nuclear deterrence has created the stability of an asymmetric deterrence which is diametrically different from the traditional strategic stability. Admittedly, there are still shortfalls in the effectiveness of China’s deterrent capability as a leverage against the US, which helps generate the opportunistic thinking on the part of the United States as to how to suppress and weaken China’s nuclear retaliation capabilities. Implementing damage limitation strategy, developing missile defense capabilities, and launching strategic anti-submarine warfare are the main maneuvers of the US strategic opportunism against China. While China endeavors to maintain its nuclear deterrent capacity and the stability of an asymmetric deterrence, the United States has been seeking to weaken China’s nuclear retaliation capability and disrupt the asymmetric nuclear stability between the two countries. In order to break the stalemate, China needs to step up efforts to improve the quality of its nuclear weapons, enhance the effectiveness of deterrence signaling, dispel the US strategic opportunistic mentality with reliable nuclear deterrence and counterattack capacities, maintain strategic stability between the two countries, especially crisis stability, and build a firm foundation for containing the outbreak of war.
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