文章摘要
杨原.超越“确保摧毁”:核武器数量、承诺可信度与核威慑原理[J].国际安全研究,2021,(5):3-38
超越“确保摧毁”:核武器数量、承诺可信度与核威慑原理
Beyond Assured Destruction: Quantity of Nuclear Weapons, Commitment Credibility and Rationale of Nuclear Deterrence
  修订日期:2021-05-06
DOI:10.14093/j.cnki.cn10-1132/d.2021.05.001
中文关键词: 核边缘;核威慑;核战略;确保摧毁;战略稳定性
英文关键词: nuclear brinkmanship, nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy, assured destruction, strategic stability
基金项目:
作者单位
杨原 中国社会科学院大学国际关系学院 北京 100732 
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中文摘要:
      现有几乎所有关于核威慑的理论和政策研究都认为,核武器数量是否达到确保摧毁门槛对核威慑有效性有决定性影响。这种“确保摧毁”原则对学界的影响已达到范式级程度,以至于学者们在争论中国核武器数量够不够这个政策问题时,均自发地从该原则出发论证各自的主张。本文认为,“确保摧毁”范式忽视了承诺可信度在核威慑生效过程中所起的关键性作用,特别是未能充分意识到核武器数量变化对承诺可信度的反向影响以及这种反向影响对核威慑生效机制的影响,因而错将是否具备确保摧毁能力作为判断核威慑是否有效的唯一标准。通过剖析核武器数量、承诺可信度与核威慑有效性三者的作用关系,充分说明,“确保摧毁”既不是核威慑有效的充分条件,也不是其必要条件;未达到确保摧毁门槛时无需增加核武器同样有可能实现有效核威慑,而达到该门槛后为确保威慑有效反而应当(继续)增加核武器。超越“确保摧毁”范式有助于更准确、更完整地理解核威慑生效的全部机制。
英文摘要:
      Almost all the existing studies on theories and policies concerning nuclear deterrence tend to believe that whether the number of nuclear weapons reaches the threshold of assured destruction has a decisive impact on the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. The impact of this “assured destruction” principle in the academic circle has reached a paradigm level so that scholars incline to expound their claims based on this principle when debating the policy issue of whether China’s nuclear weapons are sufficient or not. This paper argues that the “assured destruction” paradigm neglects the crucial role of commitment credibility in the nuclear deterrence effectiveness and fails to realize the reverse impact of changes in the number of nuclear weapons on commitment credibility as well as on the mechanism effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, which leads to a misconception that the capacity for “assured destruction” should be regarded as the sole criterion for judging whether nuclear deterrence is effective or not. By analyzing the interactive relations between the number of nuclear weapons, commitment credibility and the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, this paper points out that “assured destruction” is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for nuclear deterrence to be effective. It is totally possible to achieve effective nuclear deterrence without increasing the number of nuclear weapons when the threshold of “assured destruction” hasn’t been reached. Instead, the number of nuclear weapons should (continue to) be increased after the threshold has been reached in order to further ensure effective deterrence. Going beyond the “assured destruction” paradigm is conducive to a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the entire mechanism for the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.
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