| 李源,韩召颖.弱国升级不对称领土争端的行为逻辑[J].国际安全研究,2024,(1):56-80 |
| 弱国升级不对称领土争端的行为逻辑 |
| The Escalation Behaviors of Weaker States in Asymmetric Territorial Disputes |
| 修订日期：2023-12-01 |
| DOI：10.14093/j.cnki.cn10-1132/d.2024.01.003 |
| 中文关键词: 不对称领土争端 被惩罚预期 受害者心理 机遇—动机 |
| 英文关键词: asymmetric territorial disputes, possibility of being punished, victim mentality, opportunity-motivation |
| 基金项目: |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 在与强国的领土争端中，弱国为何会主动使用武力、升级领土争端？既有研究对于不对称形态的领土争端以及弱国的升级行为逻辑关注不足。由于争端双方的实力差距，不对称形态的领土争端对弱国的争端行为选择与强弱双方的互动具有重要影响。弱国决策者的被惩罚预期与国内社会的受害者心态，是影响弱国升级不对称领土争端的两个重要因素。弱国决策者预期升级行为不会引发强国的严厉惩罚，将促使其对升级行为的成本—收益结果持乐观态度，构成弱国升级领土争端的战略机遇。弱国在与强国互动过程中形成的受害者心理，促使其接受使用武力的潜在风险，构成弱国升级领土争端的战略动机。弱国的升级行为最终受到机遇—动机的共同作用，既是源于预期强国行为反应所带来的宝贵机会窗口，也是受害者心理形成与释放的结果。1982年阿根廷—英国马岛战争与2008年格鲁吉亚—俄罗斯冲突两个案例，可以为这一分析框架提供经验证据。该研究有助于在理论上理解不对称领土争端的爆发与升级，同时能够为中国周边领土争端的反复发生提供现实启示。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| In territorial disputes with a stronger State, why does a weaker State initiate the use of force and escalate territorial disputes? The existing research has largely overlooked the asymmetric form of territorial disputes and the behavioral logic behind the weaker state’s choices. Due to the power gap between the disputing parties, the asymmetric territorial disputes have an important impact on the weaker state’s behaviors and the interaction between the weaker State and its stronger counterpart. The weaker State policymakers’ evaluation of the punishment possibility and the victim mentality of its domestic society are the two key contributing factors that affect the weaker state’s escalation behaviors in asymmetric territorial disputes. The policymakers’ supposition that the escalation behaviors will not trigger severe punishment from the stronger State could lead them to be optimistic about the cost-benefit outcome of their choices, which contributes to the weaker state’s efforts to escalate territorial disputes. The victim mentality that the weaker State develops in its interactions with the stronger State prompts it to accept the potential risks of using force, which constitutes a strategic motivation for the weaker State to escalate territorial disputes. Two cases, the Argentine-British Malvinas War of 1982 and the Russia-Georgia Conflict of 2008, can provide empirical evidence for this analytical framework. The paper contributes to a theoretical understanding of the outbreak and escalation of asymmetrical territorial disputes, and at the same time provide practical insights into the recurrence of territorial disputes in China’s periphery. |
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