| 张建,刘祖龙.情报披露、认知对抗与美国对俄威慑的失效逻辑[J].国际安全研究,2025,(6):25-47 |
| 情报披露、认知对抗与美国对俄威慑的失效逻辑 |
| Intelligence Disclosure, Cognitive Confrontation, and the Logic of U.S. Deterrence Failure Against Russia |
| 投稿时间：2025-05-10 修订日期：2025-06-15 |
| DOI：10.14093/j.cnki.cn10-1132/d.2025.06.002 |
| 中文关键词: 情报披露武器化 威慑 俄乌冲突 认知战 美俄关系 |
| 英文关键词: weaponized intelligence disclosure, deterrence, Russia–Ukraine crisis, cognitive warfare, U.S.–Russia relations |
| 基金项目: |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 情报披露作为国家安全与外交博弈中的非传统工具，正逐步演化为一种公开化、策略化的信息施压手段。在国际关系高度竞争、战争边缘化与话语冲突加剧的背景下，情报披露的“武器化”趋势日益显著。以美国在俄乌冲突爆发前的大规模情报披露为例，情报披露被赋予阻止冲突、塑造认知、争取联盟等多重战略意图。披露机制依赖于信息控制、节奏设计、认知干扰与多手段联动构建战略压力场，旨在通过不诉诸武力的方式达成威慑目的。通过对案例的分析，可以发现由于美国缺乏可执行的军事与外交后果支撑，致使威慑信号失去可信性；俄罗斯具有高度刚性的战略意志，单纯披露行为难以动摇其安全核心判断；信息可信度与制度嵌套机制存在结构性不足，导致披露转化为“无后果表达”。此次战略失败对现有威慑理论构成挑战，也暴露出现有披露机制在高强度战略对抗中的局限。在日趋复杂的信息安全环境中，有必要对情报披露的制度规范进行重构，明确披露与行动的联动机制，提升跨国协调与战略可信度。在国家安全治理与国际战略传播中，情报披露机制的设计、管控与话语掌控能力将成为新型战略竞争的关键变量。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| As a non-traditional tool in national security and diplomatic competition, intelligence disclosure is progressively evolving into a public and strategic means of informational coercion. Amid intensifying international rivalry, the waning relevance of conventional warfare, and heightened discursive conflicts, the strategic weaponization of intelligence disclosure has emerged as a prominent trend. Using the United States’ large-scale intelligence disclosures in the run-up to the Russia–Ukraine crisis as a case study, this paper examines how these disclosures were strategically deployed to preempt war, influence public perception, and mobilize international alliances. The disclosure mechanism leverages information control, tempo management, cognitive disruption, and the coordination of interconnected policy tools to build strategic pressure while circumventing the use of force. However, analysis reveals three critical factors for the strategy’s failure: The U.S. failed to demonstrate credible military and diplomatic follow-through, thereby creating a substantial credibility deficit in its deterrence signaling; Russia’s strategic will remained highly strong, rendering it impervious to informational pressure; and finally, structural flaws in information credibility and institutional embedding undermined the effectiveness of the disclosure strategy. This strategic failure calls into question classical deterrence theory and highlights the limitations of disclosure mechanisms in high-intensity strategic confrontation. Amid increasingly complex information security landscapes, it is imperative to rebuild the institutional architecture of intelligence disclosure, forge stronger linkages between disclosure and actionable policy, and strengthen multilateral coordination and credibility. The design, governance and narrative control of disclosure mechanisms will emerge as key variables in future strategic competition for national security and international influence. |
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