| 王蕾.发展诉求嵌入国际安全制度的方式与困境[J].国际安全研究,2026,(3):55-79 |
| 发展诉求嵌入国际安全制度的方式与困境 |
| Integrating Development Demands into International Security Institutions: Approaches and Dilemmas |
| 修订日期：2025-12-10 |
| DOI：10.14093/j.cnki.cn10-1132/d.2026.03.003 |
| 中文关键词: 国际安全制度 统筹发展和安全 制度竞争 军备控制 发展中国家安全 |
| 英文关键词: international security institution, coordinating development and security, institutional competition, arms control, developing countries |
| 基金项目: |
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| 摘要点击次数: 232 |
| 全文下载次数: 113 |
| 中文摘要: |
| 国际安全制度的价值不仅体现在维护国际和平、应对安全威胁上，更是实现发展诉求的重要手段。当维护安全的措施可能对合理的发展需求构成限制时，国际安全制度应以恰当方式兼顾安全关切与发展需求。然而，将发展诉求引入国际安全制度的尝试并非总能成功。国家间博弈围绕三个维度展开：国际安全制度应否承认发展诉求、应否为发展诉求作出具体制度安排以及应以何种制度安排实现发展诉求。文章解释了每个维度上国家间博弈导向差异化结果的条件，并通过三组案例予以验证。一些国际安全制度虽承认发展诉求，却对制度安排保持模糊性。究其原因，关键在于发展诉求的倡导者或对明确的制度安排缺乏强烈需求，或是谈判时间有限。部分国际安全制度虽为发展诉求的实现提供了具体制度安排，但只有“温和”的制度主张，即拒绝控诉和挑战国家间经贸技术领域剥削与控制关系的主张，才会被国际安全制度接纳，而以挑战这种深层次权力结构为宗旨的制度主张则遭到排斥。这是因为大多数发展中国家仍对从“温和”制度方案中获利抱有期望。充分理解发展诉求嵌入国际安全制度面临的限制及其成因，有助于在实践中为克服限制寻求针对性的解决方案。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| The value of international security institutions lies not only in responding to threats and maintaining international peace, but also in contributing to the realization of development goals. When security measures impinge upon the legitimate right to development, there is a need for institutions to strike a balance between security concerns and development demands. However, in international security institutions, developing countries may fail to uphold their right to development. States mainly debate three questions: whether the requirement to achieve development goals should be recognized in international security institutions, whether specific provisions should be arranged to address such aspirations, and what kind of institutional arrangements are needed to safeguard the right to development. This article seeks to explain why developing countries succeed or fail in debates on these three questions, with its argument validated through an empirical analysis of three sets of cases. The findings indicate that some international security institutions lack concrete provisions to guarantee the right to development, even though they formally recognize such a right. This outcome may stem from either a lack of strong demands among developing countries for explicit institutional provisions, or time constraints that force states to conclude negotiations within a narrow timeframe. By contrast, other institutions include explicit provisions to protect the right to development. But only when developing countries refrain from challenging the exploitation and control that they face in economics and technology can such a “moderate” proposal for institutional arrangements be accepted. Any proposal that aims to challenge the existing power structure is likely to be rejected. A key factor behind this result is that the majority of developing countries still believe that they can benefit from “moderate” institutional arrangements. A thorough understanding of why developing countries struggle to uphold their right to development within international security institutions can offer valuable insights into viable solutions to such challenges. |
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