Page 179 - 国际安全研究2019年第5期
P. 179
Journal of International Security Studies
the security well being of mankind in the era of AI.
[Keywords] Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems, artificial intelligence, arms control
[Authors] XU Nengwu, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor, College of Liberal Arts
and Sciences, National University of Defense Technology (Changsha, 410072);
LONG Kun, M.A. Candidate, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Intern
Researcher, Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies, National University
of Defense Technology (Changsha 410072).
133 Formulating International Rules and Regulations for Nuclear
Export Control: Behavioral Patterns of the US in Multilateral
Negotiations
WANG Lei
[Abstract] The United States has long been regarded as a dominant player in the
global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, despite its active advocacy for
nuclear export control, the United States has not been able to exert due influence
over international rule-making in this area. In its efforts to revise the rules of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the United States is more inclined to justify the legitimacy
of the proposed rules than to negotiate through material powers such as pecuniary
temptation and use of threat. However, such justification based on widely accepted
non-proliferation norms does not always guarantee that the United States is able to
achieve its objectives. In the existing studies, “bargaining” and “arguing”, as two
disparate behavioral patterns in international negotiations, have been theoretically
differentiated. As regards the two patterns of negotiation, the United States has
chosen the latter in most situations, the reason of which is analyzed from the rational
choice perspective based on cost orientation. This paper has also analyzed the
elements that influence the outcome of negotiations in the case of “arguing” the
legitimacy of the rules and put forward a psychological mechanism based on the
distribution of interests. The case study of the paper focuses on four rule revision
initiatives launched in the Nuclear Suppliers Group by the administrations of three
American presidents (Jimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush).
These four initiatives contrasted sharply with each other in terms of their negotiating
modes and outcomes. This paper aims at gaining a deeper understanding of the
power as well as its limits confronted by major countries in the course of multilateral
rule-making. It is becoming increasingly common for state actors to pay close
attention to the “arguing” on legitimacy of relevant rules and deal with the
consequent challenges in the intensified contention between rules and norms in the
field of international security.
[Keywords] Nuclear Suppliers Group, export control, nuclear non-proliferation,
multilateral negotiation, rule-makin
[Author] WANG Lei, Ph.D. Student, School of International Relations and Public
Affairs, Fudan University (Shanghai, 200433).
(本期英文编辑:张国帅 高静)
· 160 ·