Page 161 - 《国际安全研究》2021年第3期
P. 161

Vo1. 39, No. 3, May/June 2021
               threats, Indonesia has shown a low  willingness to provide security-related public
               goods, thus forming a logic featuring  “free-riding” and sensitivity to the cost of
               sovereignty in its maritime security cooperation. Third, the vast high seas between
               Indonesia’s islands were once the greatest threat to its maritime security. In line with
               the 1982  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the
               international community basically recognizes Indonesia’s archipelagic rights.
               Therefore, Indonesia continues its efforts to seek shelter under the institutional
               umbrella of  UNCLOS for its  maritime security and its bottom line for  maritime
               security cooperation. Understanding Indonesia’s line of thinking and perception of
               maritime security can shed some light on  both  parties of China and Indonesia to
               facilitate maritime security cooperation.
               [Keywords] Indonesia, maritime security, the South China Sea issue, Natuna,
               maritime cooperation
               [Author] XUE Song, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of International Studies of
               Fudan University (Shanghai, 200433).

         102   Demarcation of Marine Military Activities and “Gray Zone”
               Operations of the United States in the South China Sea

               LIU Mei
               [Abstract] As a tool for maritime competition with China, the “gray zone” operations
               of the United States in the South China Sea have taken good  advantage of the
               ambiguity of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the fact that
               the Convention does not clearly lay down criteria for military activities. As a legacy
               of the Convention, the demarcation of marine military activities has claimed close
               attention from theorists, but it is still at issue in international judicial practices. In
               addition, new challenges keep arising, such as intensified conflicts of interests
               between traditional maritime powers and emerging maritime countries represented
               by China, and the increasingly  diverse forms of  maritime activities by sovereign
               states, which makes it more complicated to define marine military activities. Based
               on international judicial  practices, courts  or arbitration tribunals  mainly focus on
               three elements of maritime activities: subject factors, behavioral patterns and activity
               objectives. These three elements help develop a line of thinking in defining maritime
               activities, which tends to take subjects of maritime activities as preliminary evidence,
               underlining the examination of their behavioral patterns and taking into account
               activity objectives within a limited scope. From the empirical perspective,
               re-examining the US “gray zone” operations featuring the so-called “freedom of
               navigation operation” in the South China Sea will help China gain an objective and
               comprehensive understanding of its legal nature, launch forceful counterattacks in
               compliance with international law against the US maritime hegemonic actions and
               improve China’s response plans to rise to the US maritime operations. Only by
               doing so will China be able to avoid uncontrolled conflicts during its strengthened
               efforts to conduct law enforcement activities and safeguard its maritime rights in the


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