Page 161 - 《国际安全研究》2022年第5期

Vo1. 40, No. 5, September/October 2022
competition, Taiwan Question
[Author] ZUO Xiying, Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin
University of China (Beijing, 100872).

81 An Analysis of the U.S. Strategy of Deterrence-by-Denial against
China
CHEN Xi and GE Tengfei
[Abstract] The thoughts of deterrence by denial could date back a very long time. As
a military strategy, deterrence by denial is well known for its broad, real time and
challengeable nature. Deterrence by denial is more operational than punitive
deterrence, which gives it more advantages in the age of information warfare. The
U.S. strategic community believes that the strategy of deterrence-by-denial against
China is an optimal option when the gap between the two countries is narrowing.
The U.S. strategy of deterrence-by-denial against China was developed and flourished
during the Trump administration, mainly featured by strengthening the flexibility of
the U.S. military system and developing a new theater missile defense system. The
Biden administration has applied the strategy of deterrence-by-denial against China
under the framework of “integrated deterrence” and developed defense-in-depth
capabilities. The U.S. understanding and application of the strategy of
deterrence-by-denial have gone beyond the traditional defense-oriented model of
deterrence-by-denial. This strategy aims to pull together U.S allies to stop China’s fast
military operations in the Western Pacific region and help the U.S. gain regional
military dominance. Although the practice of the U.S. strategy of deterrence-by-denial
against China has been constrained by many internal and external factors, its negative
impact on both sides is deepening and thus poses a grave challenge to regional
security. China should proactively cultivate a favorable environment conducive to
increasing its military strength and develop new technical equipment so as to grapple
with the military coercion caused by the U.S. strategy of deterrence-by-denial against
China as well as reduce various real or potential strategic risks.
[keywords] deterrence by denial, military strategy, China-US security relations,
strategic stability
[Authors] CHEN Xi, Ph.D. Student, College of International Studies, National
University of Defense Technology; GE Tengfei, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor,
College of International Studies, National University of Defense Technology
(Nanjing, 210039).

107 Space Arms Control from the Perspective of International Security：
Origin, Evolution and Trend
XU Nengwu, LONG Kun and MENG Xin

[Abstract] Promoting space arms control is vital to the construction of a community with
a shared future for mankind, as well as the development of the space industry of all
countries. The emergence of Soviet space power in 1957 raised the specter of a “missile
gap” on the part of the United States, and the two sides soon jumped into a space arms
race. During the nuclear confrontation, it dawned on the United States and the Soviet
Union that achieving space arms control was in line with not only their own strategic
interests, but also the expectations of the international community. Therefore, in the late
1960s, a series of achievements in the first phase of space arms control were made. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a serious imbalance of power emerged in the
space field, and space arms control suffered a regression from the weak Nash

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