Page 160 - 《国际安全研究》2023年第3期

Journal of International Security Studies
since it was put forward. Relevant analyses have made multifaceted interpretations of
the background, significance, intentions, implementation steps, and challenges of the
GSI. These analyses hold that the motivations behind China’s proposition of the GSI
are either to build a new security order, open up more security opportunities, promote
security discourse, or safeguard China’s own national security. Undoubtedly, the GSI
can correct the imbalance of the international security order, promote the construction
of a new international and regional security architecture, weaken the hegemonic
position of the United States in international security affairs, and raise China’s voice
in international security issues. At present, analyses at the international level have
shifted from assessing China’s intentions to launch the GSI to evaluating its ability to
put the initiative into action. On the whole, the international public opinions towards
the feasibility of the initiative include positive responses, cautiously optimistic
outlooks, neutral wait-and-see attitudes, and pessimistic views. The reasons are not
only due to the limitations of Western geopolitical security theories as well as the
hegemonic practices of the United States. There are both general reasons for the
misreadings of international initiatives and special reasons for the misinterpretations
of security initiatives. At the same time, there exist both external reasons resulting
from deep-rooted security competition in the international community and internal
reasons for the GSI to be further concretized. Based on the “public opinion-response”
mechanism, China should treat the negative perceptions rationally, adopt targeted
response strategies and eliminate people’s misunderstandings about the GSI. More
efforts should be made to adhere to multi-directional communication, encourage more
countries to join the GSI, create a security community, explore Chinese solutions to
hotspot issues, and mitigate interferences from the United States.
[Keywords] Global Security Initiative (GSI), China, international perceptions,
promotion strategy, the Ukraine crisis
[Author] WANG Mingguo, Professor, School of Governance Management, East
China University of Political Science and Law (Shanghai, 201620).

53 After Defeat: Revenge-Seeking or Bandwagoning?
JIANG Peng

[Abstract] After regional dominance wars, the behaviors of defeated states can be
classified into four types: proactive revenge, stalemate confrontation, quiescent retreat
and bandwagoning. Classical realist foreign policy theory argues that the discrepancies
in their choices depend on the degree of leniency of the victorious state towards the
defeated one in the process of negotiating a peace treaty. However, according to the
findings of this study, the degree of leniency of the victorious state has no direct
bearing on the differentiated behavioral choices on the part of the defeated one during
the peace treaty negotiation process. The cumulative effect of the “structural factors”
and the “circumstantial factors” is the incentive behind the differentiated behavioral
choices of the defeated state. Specifically, the “structural factor” reflects whether the
defeated state still considers itself to be at the same level of power with the victorious
state, while the “circumstantial factor” reflects whether there are still other strategic
adversaries around the defeated state that may contain its power projection. Within
the framework of logical consistency, it is the diverse combinations of these two
variables that have constituted the root cause for the plurality and diversity of the
defeated state’s choice preferences. From the perspective of the victorious state,
clarifying the causal mechanism behind the behavioral choices of the defeated state
after a war for regional dominance can provide beneficial enlightenment for avoiding
falling into the quagmire of periodic confrontation and revenge on the defeated state,
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