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Journal of International Security Studies
simulate the feature set data of the next six months. The estimated data are
statistically credible and the prediction accuracy is relatively high. The findings are
that North Korea’s nuclear behavior is far from being unpredictable as perceived by
the outside. In fact, North Korea’s nuclear behavior exhibits a highly stable tendency
of patternization over a fairly long period. This paper tries to prove that when
appropriate methods are adopted, even for such information-closed countries as
DPRK, relatively accurate predictions of state behavior will work out. This modeling
approach can shed light on developing general approaches to the predictions of state
behavior.
[Keywords] North Korea’s nuclear issue, nuclear test, Bayesian method, prediction
approach, foreign policy research
[Authors] CAO Wei, Associate Professor, Department of International Politics,
University of International Relations; LIU Qian, Lecturer, Department of International
Economics, University of International Relations (Beijing, 100091); LIU Ziye, Ph.D.
Candidate, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (Beijing,
100084).

89 Internal Armed Conflicts in an Extraterritorial Context: A Strategic
Interaction Perspective
YANG Chenbo

[Abstract] Anti-government armed forces crossing national borders to carry out
resistance operations pose a tremendous threat to regional security. The externalization
of internal conflicts has become a hot topic among researches in the field of
international security. With regard to the extraterritorial context of internal armed
conflicts, this paper aims to analyze the strategic interaction pattern among the target
state, the insurgents and the host state by establishing a game theory model. The
extraterritorial context of internal conflicts can sabotage both domestic stability of
the target state and regional security. The game theory model developed by this
paper tries to illustrate conflict risks in an extraterritorial context by focusing on
strategic moves of the target state, the host state and the insurgents. When
information asymmetry exists between the insurgents and the host state, strategic
interactions will lead to several possible scenarios in regard to situations of armed
conflicts and the bilateral relationship between the target state and the host state. The
model tries to delineate possible conditions for different conflict dynamics. It is
generally argued that the conditional factors include 1) the capacity of the host state
to exert influence on insurgents’ behavior, 2) the ability of the target state to prevent
the insurgents from receiving support from the host state, and 3) the extent of
interdependence between the target state and the host state. The fact that the
externalization of internal conflicts are interwoven with state-to-state hostility poses
extra challenges for peacekeeping operations and the mediation efforts exerted by
regional security mechanisms. Relevant states as well as international security
institutions are supposed to discern the particular strategic context of each conflict,
which contributes to the creation of long-term peacekeeping programmes.
[Keywords] civil conflict, insurgent funding, insurgents’ border transgression,
coercion, strategic interactions
[Author] YANG Chenbo, Assistant Professor, School of Social Sciences, Shenzhen
University (Shenzhen, 518060).

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