Page 159 - 《国际安全研究)》2020年第2期
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Vo1. 38, No. 2, March/April 2020
is increasing. China-US economic and trade frictions have indicated that economic
and trade cooperation, the traditional cornerstone of bilateral ties, can just play a
limited role in handling the “new situation” of strategic competition. To effectively
prevent the “new situation” from escalating into full-scale confrontations and
conflicts, it is imperative for the two countries to explore a “new paradigm” that
helps redefine their roles, handle and control their bilateral relationship. The global
governance structure with global security governance as an essential part of it,
provides a relatively stable institutional system for China-US strategic gaming and
balance of power. By clarifying the boundaries of strategic competition, constructing
a platform for dialogue and coordination, and effectively drawing support from third
parties, China and the US can proactively facilitate rational competition and
constructive cooperation, which will directly bring about changes to the concepts,
systems and models of global security governance. Such endeavors are not only in
line with the fundamental interests of both sides and the universal aspirations of the
international community, but also fit in with the particular needs of the development
of sound global governance. A major issue, however, stands in the way of
establishing the “new paradigm”: a new “cornerstone” should be explored in view of
the unstable role played by economic and trade cooperation and the insufficient
cooperation over global security governance. In the future, given that strategic
competition features in the China-US relations, a new “cornerstone” can be forged
by achieving the balance of power between the two great powers through the
establishment of a relatively stable mechanism via power gaming.
[Keywords] China-US relations, great-power competition, new paradigm, global
security governance
[Authors] AN Gang, Research Fellow at the Center for International Strategy and
Security of Tsinghua University and Editor of World Affairs (Beijing, 100020); WANG
Yiming, Ph.D. Student at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of
China (Beijing, 100872); HU Xin, Associate Professor at the Institute of Strategy and
Security Studies, College of International Studies, National University of Defense
Technology (Nanjing, 210039).
49 An Analysis of the Relationship between the INF Treaty and Global
Strategic Stability
GUO Xiaobing and LONG Yun
[Abstract] The INF Treaty, an important arms control treaty reached by the United
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, served as one of the major pillars
of global strategic stability. In August 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew
from the INF Treaty one after another, arousing great concerns from the
international community. The misgivings are that their withdrawal from the treaty
will affect global strategic stability and security situations in Europe and Asia,
trigger a new round of arms race and undermine the international arms control
system. China has been taken by the United States as an important excuse for its
withdrawal, so the demise of the treaty is bound to exert a profound impact on
China’s external security environment. This paper intends to review the creation,
development and termination of the INF Treaty, analyze its evolutionary causes on
the international, domestic and personal levels and concludes that changes in the
international landscape have played a decisive role in making the treaty rise and fall.
In the 1980s, changes in the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the
United States led to the birth of the INF Treaty. In the 21st centurary, pressures from
NATO and the proliferation of missile technology prompted Russia to launch the
initiative to globalize the INF Treaty. In recent years, the relative decline of the US
hegemonic position has created the environment for the US to opt out of the INF
Treaty. At the same time, domestic politics and leadership changes in the United
States and Russia have also exerted profound influence on the timing and mode of
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