Page 159 - 《国际安全研究》2021年第5期

Vo1. 39, No. 5, September/October 2021

Abstract

3 Beyond Assured Destruction: Quantity of Nuclear Weapons,
Commitment Credibility and Rationale of Nuclear Deterrence

YANG Yuan

[Abstract] Almost all the existing studies on theories and policies concerning nuclear
deterrence tend to believe that whether the number of nuclear weapons reaches the
threshold of assured destruction has a decisive impact on the effectiveness of nuclear
deterrence. The impact of this “assured destruction” principle in the academic circle
has reached a paradigm level so that scholars incline to expound their claims based
on this principle when debating the policy issue of whether China’s nuclear weapons
are sufficient or not. This paper argues that the “assured destruction” paradigm
neglects the crucial role of commitment credibility in the nuclear deterrence
effectiveness and fails to realize the reverse impact of changes in the number of
nuclear weapons on commitment credibility as well as on the mechanism
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, which leads to a misconception that the capacity
for “assured destruction” should be regarded as the sole criterion for judging
whether nuclear deterrence is effective or not. By analyzing the interactive relations
between the number of nuclear weapons, commitment credibility and the
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, this paper points out that “assured destruction”
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for nuclear deterrence to be effective.
It is totally possible to achieve effective nuclear deterrence without increasing the
number of nuclear weapons when the threshold of “assured destruction” hasn’t been
reached. Instead, the number of nuclear weapons should (continue to) be increased
after the threshold has been reached in order to further ensure effective deterrence.
Going beyond the “assured destruction” paradigm is conducive to a more accurate
and comprehensive understanding of the entire mechanism for the effectiveness of
nuclear deterrence.
[Keywords] nuclear brinkmanship, nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy, assured
destruction, strategic stability
[Author] YANG Yuan, Associate Professor, School of International Relations,
University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Associate Research Fellow,
Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(Beijing, 100720).

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