Page 160 - 《国际安全研究》2020年第3期

Journal of International Security Studies
to them. Contrary to the “coercive” strategy, the “reassurance” strategy underlines
the importance of winning the trust and confidence of other countries via positive
incentives. Based on a critical integration of the existing literature, this paper tends
to discuss two important dimensions: ways of sending good will (emotion-substance)
and sources of cost (endogenous-exogenous). Logically speaking, there are four
paths to expressing reassuring good-neighboring signals: good neighborliness
discourse, interdependence, selfless assistance and institutional restraint. Faced with
China’s assurance, Southeast Asian countries will actively explore and identify their
possible choices, and then examine and evaluate China’s signals from four strategic
perspectives: bargaining, socialization, hedging exploration and institutional
containment. Due to the problem of subjectivity in the credibility assessment of
signals, Southeast Asian countries have different understandings of China’s
reassurance efforts. In view of this, China’s diplomacy needs to stimulate
perspective-taking and understand the exploratory attempts of these neighboring
countries.
[Keywords] China’s peaceful rise, signal transmission, intention perception,
strategic reassurance, trust building
[Author] CAO Dejun, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of International Relations
of Peking University (Beijing,100871).

46 The Construction and Impact of Japan’s “Multi-Domain Defense
Force” in the Competitive Era
MENG Xiaoxu
[Abstract] Japan’s new defense strategy of “multi-domain defense force” extends
Japan’s defense from traditional fields of land, sea, air to multiple domains like
space, cyberspace and electromagnetism with greater emphasis on an integrated
defense among various domains. As a comprehensive defense strategy, it also
underlines defense on all fronts and at all stages from peacetime to “emergency”,
from self-defense to Japan-US alliance and multi-layered security cooperation, from
“front battlefield” to “rear system”. In order to carry out “cross-domain operation”,
Japan has put forward priority projects and focused actions, placing particular
emphasis on acquiring and reinforcing relevant defense capabilities in new domains
such as space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. At the same time, Japan
has also enhanced its sea-air capabilities, missile defense and off-defense strike
capabilities in traditional areas, and adjusted its self-defense force system
accordingly. The integration of the new defense strategy into the Indo-Pacific
concept has further facilitated the development of Japan’s multi-dimensional
cross-domain defense system. Taken together, the new strategy of “multi-domain
defense force” is formulated in a highly competitive era in which Japan endeavors to
keep himself in tune with the US military strategic adjustments, consolidate the
Japan-US alliance, actively assess and respond to the security situation in this
particular era, effectively addressing the challenges of the global military
transformation in those new fields, better resolve the existing island disputes and
strengthen its maritime defense. All of these have fueled Japan’s strive to construct a
new defense strategy that will bring about far reaching consequences. Japan’s
defense autonomy seems rather difficult to attain, the cornerstones of Japan’s
post-war security strategy may be changed, and competition may arise in the new
fields with adverse effects on the construction of a favorable constructive security
relationship between China and Japan. In this regard, China needs to further enhance
its comprehensive strength, make positive efforts to clear up Japan’s doubts about
security issues in the bilateral relations, expand defense exchanges and security
dialogues, and enhance security mutual trust between the two countries.

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