Page 161 - 《国际安全研究》2022年第4期

Vo1. 40, No. 4, July/August 2022
completely take sides between China and the US. However, as the world advances into
the digital era, the US has been persisting in its efforts since 2018 to constrain the strength
and global influence of China’s digital technology. Relying on technological advantages
and alliance networks, the US set out to constrain China through expanding its security
protection scope from the physical space to the digital space. Responding to such US
efforts to transform its security system, China and most other East Asian countries still opt
for the hedging approach. In other words, the East Asian security order continues to be
characterized by the hedging pattern as it enters the digital era. The continuity of a hedging
order can be explained by two factors. First, for East Asian countries, security threats in
the physical space are still their primary concerns, which also has significant impact on
their perception of security threats in the digital space. Second, the US’s capability
advantage and its policy choices generate feelings of uncertainty among those countries
seeking US protection in the digital space. Strategic hedging, thus, is the choice most
conducive to maximizing national interests of these countries. These findings can not only
help deepen our theoretical understanding of the regional/international order
transformation in the digital era, but highlight the policy implications for managing China-
US strategic competition in the digital era.
[Keywords] digital technology competition, digital age, security order, East Asia, Sino-
U.S. relations
[Author] SUN Xuefeng, Professor, Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua
University (Beijing, 100084).

91 Logic of Hegemony: The Multilateral Transformation of the US
Asia-Pacific Security Strategy
LING Shengli and WANG Yanfei
[Abstract] After the end of World War II, the US successfully built a network of bilateral
alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, it has become more active in
strengthening multilateral security cooperation. From the Obama administration to the
Biden administration, the US government has made significant adjustments in its Asia-
Pacific security strategy, pushing for a shift from bilateralism to multilateralism. It is
worth exploring the reason why the shift has occurred. The US tends to promote bilateral
cooperation when it has a huge power advantage. When its power advantage shrinks, it
places greater emphasis on multilateral cooperation. Whether its security cooperation is
prone to forge alliances or adopt a relatively loose form of security cooperation depends
on the nature of external threats and the degree of internal disagreements. The adjustment
of forms of US security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region results from the narrowing
power gap between China and the US, changes in external threats and disagreements
among its allies. The multilateral form of security cooperation offers the US a greater
capacity to mobilize its allies and maintain its hegemonic position. The US-Japan-ROK
trilateral cooperation, the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, the Five Eyes and the
Quad are all typical examples of the US efforts to shift from bilateralism to multilateralism.
The US multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region boasts a solid