Page 160 - 《国际安全研究》2021年第2期

Journal of International Security Studies
unprecedented challenges. It should be noted that the United States bears a particular
responsibility for the retrogression in the process of global non-proliferation and
nuclear disarmament. This can be examined from three interrelated perspectives.
Firstly, the classic nuclear deterrence theory cannot fully explain the contradictory
nuclear strategy and non-proliferation policy of the United States. The absolute free
nuclear strategy featuring war-fighting deterrence and extended deterrence has
always been the fundamental principle guiding the US nuclear policies. Secondly,
the re-exploration of the Cold War history during the 1950s and 1960s reveals that
the general view that the US nuclear strategy swung between the conservatives who
advocate for nuclear weapons to be used for actual combat and the liberals who
advocate for nuclear weapons to be used only for deterrence has exaggerated the
influence of the liberals over the US nuclear strategy. Throughout most of the
presidencies, the United States tends to regard absolute free nuclear strategy as the
key to safeguarding the postwar international order and gaining strategic advantages
over the Soviet Union. Finally, the interaction between nuclear weapons and
non-nuclear weapons has become a prominent feature of the current nuclear era.
With the emerging new technological revolution, traditional nuclear deterrence and
strategic stability are facing extremely complex challenges. Against this backdrop,
the United States still puts much emphasis on the integration of nuclear and
conventional weapons as well as the combination of offensive and defensive actions
to secure its absolute predominance over other countries and relies on emerging
technologies and cross-domain deterrence to ensure its overall victory. As a result,
the “ternary paradoxes” triggered by the interaction between nuclear weapons and
conventional weapons, the pursuit of technological first mover advantage as well as
the absolute freedom will continue to exert impact on the global strategic stability
and the international non-proliferation regime.
[Keywords] US nuclear strategy, NPT, deterrence only, war-fighting deterrence,
new technology revolution
[Author] JIANG Tianjiao, Ph.D., Lecturer, Fudan Development Institute (FDDI)
(Shanghai, 200433).

61 An Analysis of China-US Asymmetric Nuclear Stability and the US
Strategic Opportunism
HU Gaochen
[Abstract] It is notable that the security relationship between China and the United
States plays a pivotal role in the overall Sino-US relations and studies on the
strategic stability between the two countries are of paramount significance for
maintaining the stability of the bilateral security relations. The relatively weaker
capacity in China’s nuclear deterrence has created the stability of an asymmetric
deterrence which is diametrically different from the traditional strategic stability.
Admittedly, there are still shortfalls in the effectiveness of China’s deterrent
capability as a leverage against the US, which helps generate the opportunistic
thinking on the part of the United States as to how to suppress and weaken China’s
nuclear retaliation capabilities. Implementing damage limitation strategy, developing
missile defense capabilities, and launching strategic anti-submarine warfare are the
main maneuvers of the US strategic opportunism against China. While China
endeavors to maintain its nuclear deterrent capacity and the stability of an asymmetric

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