Page 68 - 《国际安全研究》2021年第2期
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中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析

                 中美在核武器的数量和部署模式上也存在差异。根据公开的数据资料,美国目
            前拥有总计 5 800 枚核弹头,其中实战部署的(Deployed)共 1 750 枚,储藏的(Reserve)
                                               ①
                                                                               ②
            2 050 枚,退役和待拆解的 2 000 枚。   而中国的数量总计仅为 320 枚,   且多为
            储藏状态。因此,就数量而言,中国与美国存在较大差距,中美不在一个对等数量
            级;就部署模式而言,中国的核武器处于头体分离的状态,而美国拥有较多数量头
            体对接、随时可用的部署核武器。总之,中美核实力、数量不对等,核戒备姿态也

            不同,这是两国战略实力不对称的主要表现。
               (二)对手感知:中国核威慑能力有效但没有富余
                 美国国内对中国核报复能力存在着不同的认知和看法。美国有学者对中国具备
            可靠的威慑能力抱有积极的认可态度,认为中美两国之间的相互脆弱是事实,而不

                                 ③
            是(政策上的)选择。   相互脆弱(Mutual Vulnerability)是指两个国家都不可能
            通过先发制人的核打击以及其他措施解除对手的核报复能力,双方面临对方的核报
            复打击时都是脆弱的,因此双方都不敢在使用核武器上轻举妄动。认可中美之间的

            相互脆弱状态,即是承认中国对美国核威慑能力有效。美国战略学界认可中美相互
                                 ④
            脆弱关系的观点较多,  甚至还有学者将中美相互脆弱的概念应用在除核领域之外
                                                                             ⑤
            的太空和网络领域,认为中美在核网天三大领域都存在相互脆弱关系。

                ①  Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the
            Atomic Scientists, Vol. 76, No. 1, 2020, pp. 46-60; SIPRI Yearbook 2020, Armaments, Disarmament
            and International Security, World Nuclear Forces, p. 328.
                ②  SIPRI Yearbook 2020, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, World Nuclear
            Forces, p. 356.
                ③  United States of America Department of State, International Security Advisory Board, Report
            on Maintaining U.S.-China Strategic  Stability, October 26, 2012, pp. 3-4; “Memorandum for the
            Chairman, International Security Advisory Board (ISAB),” ISAB Study on  Maintaining U.S.-China
            Strategic Stability, July 5, 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/170752.pdf.
                ④  “PONI Debates the Issues:  U.S.-China Mutual  Vulnerability,” Center for  Strategic  and
            International Studies, April 16, 2012, http://C689420.R20.CF2.RACKCDN.COM/120416_PONI.MOV;
            Gregory Kulacki, “Mutual Vulnerability with China: A Reality, Not a Choice,” Union of Concerned
            Scientists Blog All  Things Nuclear, October  11, 2013, http://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/mutual-
            vulnerability-with-china-a-reality-not-a-choice; Brad  Glosserman and Eleni Ekmektsioglou,  “Strategic
            Stability in US-China Relations,” ISPI Policy Brief, May 2011, No. 210, pp. 1-5; James M Acton, “Managing
            Vulnerability,” March 1, 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/03/01/managing-vulnerability/3j6v.
                ⑤ David C. Gompert  and Phillip C. Saunders,  The Paradox of Power  Sino-American  Strategic
            Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011, p.  xiii;
            David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, “The Future of Sino-American Relations,” The National Interest,
            January 12, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-future-sino-american-relations-6358.
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