Page 69 - 《国际安全研究》2021年第2期

2021 年第 2 期

还有美国学者认为中国的战略武器具备威慑实力。他们提出，中国核武器的生
①
存能力确保了核报复能力足够有效； 确保二次打击的报复能力是中国威慑战略的
目标，随着中国核武器的机动性、隐蔽性等生存能力的增强，尤其是公路机动弹道

②
导弹的部署，中国只需要少量核武器即可达到这一战略目标； 中国加速部署的新
③
一代公路机动弹道导弹，实现了可信的威慑。 还有学者认为中国具备海基核报复
④
能力， 提出中国海基核威慑力量的生存能力不断提高，促使美国不得不考虑接受
⑤
与中国的相互脆弱关系。
美国国内也存在反对上述观点的声音，反对观点呈现出从较为明确的否认向
回避态度的转变。早年的研究成果从中国洲际弹道导弹的发射准备时间长、战略

① Christopher Bolkcom, Shirley A. Kan and Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Conventional Forces and
Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress Order
Code RL33607, August 11, 2006, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs9510/m1/1/high_res
_d/RL33607_2006Aug11.pdf; Robert A. Manning, “The Future of U.S. Extended Deterrence in Asia to
2025,” Atlantic Council Brent Scowcroft Center On International Security, October 2014,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Future_US_Ext_Det_in_Asia.pdf.
② M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The
Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2,
2010, pp. 48-87; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s
Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2015, pp.
7-50.
③ James Mulvenon, “Chinese and Mutually Assured Destruction: Is China Getting MAD?”
Chapter 8, in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins
and Practice, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2004, pp. 239-259, https://www.
questia.com/read/110525419/getting-mad-a-nuclear-mutual-assured-destruction.
④ Jesse L. Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Modernization: US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission Testimony,” Appendix A. 2014 ONI Testimony on China’s Navy, Hearing Before
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s Military Modernization and Its
Implications for the United States, January 30, 2014; Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research
Service, September 21, 2015, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL3315; Thomas M.
Skypek, China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China’s SSBN
Fleet, in Collection of Papers from the 2010 Nuclear Scholars Initiative, Washington D.C., Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2010, pp. 105-121, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/10/
chinas-sea-based-nuclear-deterrent-in-2020-four-alternative-futures-for-chinas-ssbn-fleet/; James R.
Holmes and Toshi Yoshimara, “China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent Strategy, Doctrine, and
Capabilities,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 50, 2008, pp. 31-38.
⑤ Christian Conroy, “China’s Ballistic-Missile Submarines: How Dangerous?” The National
Interest, November 18, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinas-ballistic-missile-submarines-
how-dangerous-9414.
· 67 ·