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南海问题与中美新型双边军事关系的构建

            更是进一步明确坚定了这一方向。这些需要达成的目标包括,保护海上交通线(sea
            lanes of communication)和控制关键阻塞点的能力,海军远洋(比如印度洋)军力投
                                                                                 ①
            射能力以及被美国等西方国家称为“反介入/区域拒止(A2/AD)”的能力。
                在过去的十年间,中国海军一直致力于建设一支集近海控制、直至第二条岛弧链
                                                                                      ②
            的防御拒止,并且可以保护海上交通线和扩大中国政治和外交影响力的海上力量。
            实际上,由于其他声索国与中国之间军力悬殊,加上同时使用武力可能带来的负面政

            治影响,虽然多数分析家不认为中国和其他声索国在近期会发生任何军事冲突,但这
            一判断并不适用于中美在亚太地区公海上的相遇。事实上,在美国看来,中国对于外
            国军事船只在靠近其专属经济区内的活动而表现出的不断提升的自信,已经对美国长
            期坚持的航行自由原则,尤其是美国所认为的航行自由应该包含的内容——包括进行

            监视和情报收集——造成了严重的威胁,这种威胁可能会导致双方的军事对抗。
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                 在 1998 年 6 月,中国政府发布了《中华人民共和国专属经济区和大陆架法》。
            中国军事分析家指出,“任何在专属经济区内危害到沿海国主权或安全的军事活动

                                                ④
            都是不合法的,是不能够被容忍的”。   中国在 1996 年批准《公约》生效后,就
            无害通过(innocent passage)发表了如下声明:“根据沿海国的法律法规,《公约》


                ①  James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions’,” China Leadership
            Monitor, No. 27 (Winter 2009), pp. 1-11; Cortez A. Cooper, The PLA Navy’s “New Historic Missions,”
            Santa Monica: RAND, June 2009; “Sea Power: Who Rules the Waves?” The Economist, October 17,
            2015, pp. 56-58; Michael McDewitt, Becoming a Great Maritime Power: A Chinese Dream, Alexander,
            VA: Center for Naval Analysis, June 2016.
                ②  Peter Layton,  “Chinese Sea  Power and Force Projection,”  Defence Today, July-September
            2015, pp. 23-26; Christopher H. Sharman,  China Moves Out: Stepping Stone Toward a Maritime
            Strategy, Washington, D.C.: National Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July
            2015;  Andrew  S. Erickson, “Evaluating China’s  Conventional Military Power: The Naval and  Air
            Dimensions,” in Jae Ho Chung, ed., Assessing China’s Power, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015,
            pp. 65-90.
                ③  Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic
            Rivalry,”  The Washington  Quarterly,  Vol. 35, No. 2  (Spring 2012), pp. 139-156; Peter  Dutton,
            “Introduction,” in Peter Dutton, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security
            and International Law in the  Maritime Commons, New Port, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute,
            Naval War College, December 2010, pp. 1-13; Peter Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives:
            China and the South China Sea,” Naval War College Review, No. 64, No. 4 (Autumn 2011), pp. 42-67.
                ④  Peng Guangqian, “China’s Maritime Rights  and Interests,”  in Peter Dutton, ed.,  Military
            Activities in  the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue  on Security and International Law in the Maritime
            Commons, New Port, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College, December 2010,
            pp. 15-22.
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