Page 45 - 《国际安全研究》2020年第4期
P. 45

2020 年第 4 期

               议。   援助人员进入特定国家更是在“安全化”与“政治化”情势之下面临较难的
                   ①
               处境:如 2018 年 10 月,印尼面对一场损失巨大的海啸时,依然要求参与救援的对
                                                            ②
               外援助工作人员和相关机构“立即撤走其人员”。   有学者认为,当受援国将国家
               安全考量置于人道主义危机之上时,可能就会出现拒绝援助的情况,也就是所谓拒
                                                                                        ③
               绝“特洛伊木马式的礼物”,因此,拒绝援助“就其核心而言”是一种政治行为。
                   由此可见,因为对外援助的资源性和工具性特征,援助的“安全化”比其他

               领域的安全化在“言语—行动”方面呈现出更为明显的冲突性或不一致性。无论
               是援助国还是受援国,它们作为安全化行为主体,都针对相关听众(如国内精英、
               选民和利益集团等)积极提出相应安全化话语,并建构战略目标之“援助无用”
               或者援助效果之“援助有害”等威胁框架和新安全话语(如“失败和脆弱国家”

              “国家脆弱性”“流氓援助”“全政府路径”“综合路径”“平衡路径”“反恐战争”
               等),从而来获取操纵援助国对外援助政策或受援国援助资源和项目利用方面的
               主导权和合法性;除此之外,援助“安全化”还表现在援助资源分配变化与国内

                                    ④
               政策空间变更等方面。   但援助“安全化”的确对全球援助治理框架带来若干风
                   ⑤
               险。   援助安全化之副作用直接在援助国与受援国互动中将援助之初衷如“不为
               害”(Do No Harm)和中立原则等边缘化。有的援助实践机构认为,尽管援助“安
               全化”为发展工作共同体“重申作为满足贫穷且脆弱民众的安全和正义”提供了


                  ①  Manuela Andreoni, “Brazil Angrily Rejects  Millions in Amazon Aid Pledged at G7, Then
               Accepts British  Aid,”  The New York Times, August 27, 2019,  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/
               world/americas/brazil-amazon-aid.html;  Anatoly Kurmanaev, Ana Vanessa Herrero and Ernesto
               Londoño, “Venezuela’s Opposition Plans to Deliver Aid, Undermining Maduro,” The New York Times,
               February 5, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/05/world/americas/venezuela-humanitarian-aid.
               html; Amy Kazmin, “India’s Rejection of $100m Foreign Flooding Aid Sparks Anger in Kerala,” The
               Financial Times, August 27, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/86e4bb4e-a785-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b.
                  ②  Kate Lyons, “Indonesia Orders Foreign Aid Workers Helping with Tsunami Effort to Leave,”
               The Guardian, October 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/09/indonesia-orders-
               foreign-aid- workers-helping-with-tsunami-effort-to-leave.
                  ③  Travis Nelson, “Rejecting the Gift Horse: International Politics of Disaster  Aid Refusal,”
               Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2010, pp. 379-402.
                  ④  Stephen Brown, Jörn Grävingholt and Rosalind Raddatz, “The Securitization of Foreign Aid:
               Trends, Explanations and Prospects,” in Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt, eds., The Securitization
               of Foreign Aid, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 239-240; Moses Naim,
               “Rogue Aid,” Foreign Policy, October 15, 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/15/rogue-aid/.
                  ⑤  Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt, “Security, Development and the Securitization of
               Foreign  Aid,” in Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt,  eds.,  The Securitization of  Foreign Aid,
               Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 10.
                                                                                     · 43 ·
   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48   49   50